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Andrew J. Kalafut
PROACTIVE CYBERFRAUD DETECTION THROUGH INFRASTRUCTURE ANALYSIS
Internet users are threatened daily by spam, phishing, and malware. These attacks are often launched
using armies of compromised machines, complicating identification of the miscreants behind the
attacks. Unfortunately, most current approaches to fight these problems are reactive in nature,
allowing significant damage before security measures are adapted to new attacks. For example,
blacklisting prevents communications with known malicious hosts, but many users may fall victim
to an attack before blacklists are updated. In this dissertation we argue for a proactive approach to
fighting cybercrime. Our approach relies on the observation that to avoid attribution and to stay up
amidst take-down attempts, miscreants must provision their infrastructure differently than legitimate
web sites. Thus, we propose to proactively identify malicious activity using unique characteristics of
malicious web site provisioning. Specifically, using near real-time feeds of malicious web hosts, we
investigate the extent to which miscreants use five specific provisioning practices. The first three are
based on the Domain Name System (DNS), which translates host names to IP addresses. We first
examine fast-flux, a practice where the association between name and address changes much more
frequently than usual. We then investigate the use of DNS wildcards, which point many host names
to a single address. Next, we examine the use of orphan DNS servers, which are DNS servers in
non-existent domains. Then, we study the concentration of malicious activity in certain networks.
Finally, we examine web redirects, which may appear to be links to legitimate web sites but in reality
trick users into visiting malicious sites. We find that although good web sites sometimes make use
of some of these techniques, malicious web sites are more likely to use them. Consequently, their
presence can be used for proactive identification of malicious web sites.
vii
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1Introduction
Internet users are threatened by scam, phishing, and malware on a daily basis. Although many
of these cyberfraud attacks begin through channels such as email, Web searches, and online social
networks, they often lead users to web sites controlled by miscreants. There, unsuspecting users
may be victimized by scams or tricked into revealing sensitive personal information. Further, their
computers may be infected with malware, potentially becoming bots under the control of a miscreant,
from which further attacks may be launched.
These attacks are lucrative for the miscreants, and the risks to users from them is on the rise.
According to an Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG) report [1], phishing attacks more than
doubled from the first half of 2009 to the second half. According to the Internet Crime Complaint
Center (IC3) 2009 Internet Crime Report [35], 336,655 complaints were submitted in 2009, a 22%
increase over 2008. The total dollar losses from cases they referred to law enforcement was $559.7
million, the highest since they began operation, and over double the 2008 amount. Also, a January
2010 Consumer Reports survey [12] concludes that in the previous two years, American consumers
lost $4.5 billion to viruses, spyware, and phishing.
1.1 Current Approaches
Many current approaches exist to protect users from the problems we address. The major approaches
currently in use include blacklists and anti-virus software. Blacklists are lists of malicious Uniform
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Resource Locators (URLs), domains, or IP addresses, which users should be prevented from visiting.
Blacklists are often used by browser toolbars, search engines, and spam filters, to warn users or
prevent them from visiting malicious web sites. Anti-virus software typically runs on end user
computers and looks for binary files containing certain byte sequences matching known malware.
This detection requires the malware to be downloaded before it can be identified. More advanced
anti-virus looks for specific sequences of system calls used by known malware. This detection comes
later, after the malware has started running.
Given how commonly users are reported to fall prey to these attacks, it is clear that the ap-
proaches described above are not effective enough. In part this is attributable to a common draw-
back they all share: they are reactive. As a result, they may allow significant damage before they
are adapted to new attacks. Consider blacklisting as an example. A malicious web site has to be
discovered, often through slow means such as user reporting, verified, added to a blacklist, and new
copies of the blacklist distributed, before the web site is blocked. Since the same malicious URL
may be emailed to a large number of recipients in a phishing attack, there is large opportunity for
many victims to visit the malicious site before any realize it is malicious and report it. The problem
is essentially the same for anti-virus software as well. There is an inherent lag between the time a
new attack appears and the time a signature is generated for it.
The reactive nature of these approaches has another unfortunate side effect: many attacks may
be missed. Consequently, some attacks may only ever get reported to maintainers of one blacklist
or anti-virus product and not others. This leads to a difference in what can be detected depending
on the product being used. In fact, we observe large differences in blacklists meant to serve similar
purposes as each other. In two feeds of phishing sites we receive, one contained 36,067 phishing
URLs in June 2010, while another only contained 14,879 URLs during the same time period. Each
list misses many URLs; Only 7,174 were in both lists.
Actual take-down of a malicious web site avoids the issues in blacklist coverage, protecting
all users regardless of which security products or blacklists they may be using. However, for many
reasons including communications difficulties and the indifference of some Internet Service Providers
(ISPs) to deal with the problem, this also comes too late, after malicious web sites may have already
done some damage. This is corroborated by the fact that the median life time for a scam site is over
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a week [4]. Phishing site life times are shorter, but still average 31 hours after being detected [1].
By dealing with only certain domain names or IP addresses currently involved in attacks, or
certain types of malware, current methods only deal with the symptoms of attacks. Because they
do not focus on the behavior of the attackers, these approaches do nothing to solve the overall
problem. Consequently, when a malicious web sit is shut down, attackers are free to continue similar
slightly modified attacks. Therefore, an approach that identifies common features of attacks instead
of individual attacks themselves is likely to be useful.
1.2 Our Approach
In this dissertation, we work towards the goal of proactive identification of malicious web sites
involved in cyberfraud such as phishing, malware, and scams. We take an experimental approach
to the problem, examining malicious web sites to develop light-weight features that can be used for
proactive identification. Our features are motivated by the observation that attackers have differing
requirements from benign web site operators for provisioning the infrastructure for their web sites.
When a good web site operator sets up a web server, they are mainly concerned with providing
high quality service to their users. They may over-provision to deal with occasional attacks. In
contrast, malicious web site operators must provision for availability in spite of take-down attempts
by law enforcement or their ISP. An additional unique concern of attackers is escaping detection and
attribution. Due to this concern and others, attackers often provision their web sites using botnets,
armies of compromised machines. This practice exacerbates their availability problems, since these
compromised machines may be cleaned or shut down at any time. A further concern of malicious web
site operators is protecting the most valuable parts of their infrastructure, such as faster computers,
computers outside of firewalls, or those with public IP addresses. Another concern of malicious
operators is the desire to be resilient to blacklisting of IP addresses and host names they are using.
We hypothesize that to accomplish these goals, miscreants must provision the infrastructure of their
web sites differently from benign web sites.
Our approach to proactive identification of malicious web sites is to identify these sites using
the unique features of their infrastructure provisioning. We use the term infrastructure provisioning
1. Introduction 4
to include all aspects of how these web sites are provisioned. This includes how the malicious web
site operators set up their web and Domain Name System (DNS) servers, how they connect these
sites to the Internet, and how the operators attract visitors to their sites. Using knowledge about
the provisioning practices beneficial to attackers, we aim to develop features which can be used
to proactively identify malicious web sites, preferably before they attract visitors. Because of the
large number of domains in the Internet, currently over 193 million [107], proactive identification
would be impossible if the features were slow. Therefore, we additionally require our features to be
light-weight.
Web sites that are determined to be malicious based on their infrastructure provisioning should
then be further scrutinized or blocked. We envision two ways this could be realized. One method
would be a monitoring system. Such a system would harvest URLs and domain names from several
sources including spam trap email addresses and traffic seen by routers cooperating with the mon-
itoring system. The monitoring system would apply tests for infrastructure features to each site,
and using a classifier, flag potentially malicious sites. This information could then be published in a
blacklist, different from current blacklists by the scope of coverage and speed in identifying malicious
web sites. A second possible method of applying our features would be by programs at end hosts,
most likely web browsers. They would test each URL they visit, especially if the link to the URL
came from an external source such as an email program or a domain other than the one the link is
leading to.
Specifically, our contribution in this dissertation is the investigation of five features of malicious
web site infrastructure provisioning that may be used in a framework to detect malicious web sites.
We examine fast flux, the use of DNS wildcards, the use of orphan DNS servers, disproportionately
malicious Autonomous Systems (ASes), and use of redirects. We focus on showing that each feature
can identify a subset of malicious activity and is light-weight, not on the effectiveness of any particular
combination of features.
1.3 Organization
We organize the rest of this dissertation as follows.
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1.3.1 Background
Before examining each feature of malicious web site infrastructure provisioning, some background
knowledge is necessary. We discuss three aspects of background material. First, because the first
three of the infrastructure properties we examine relate to the domain name system, in Chapter 2
we discuss DNS, including a measurement study of which types of DNS records are used most. Next,
because the work in this dissertation examining each infrastructure property is highly data-driven,
we describe our data sources in Chapter 3. Finally, after examining our infrastructure features, in
Chapter 9 we discuss related work, including work related to each feature, as well as other malicious
infrastructure, and complementary approaches.
1.3.2 Infrastructure Features
We investigate five features of infrastructure provisioning which may be useful in a framework for
identification malicious web sites. We devote a chapter to exploring each one.
Fast Flux
The first infrastructure provisioning practice we investigate, in Chapter 4, is fast flux [58]. Fast
flux is a technique used by miscreants to provide high availability of their web sites in spite of take-
down attempts. Take-down attempts can focus in two areas, revoking the domain name used by the
miscreants, and cleaning the bots the miscreant is hosting the attack on. Fast flux helps miscreants
mitigate the effects of the latter. The host name of a web site taking advantage of fast flux resolves
to a large number of IP addresses. These addresses are geographically diverse and change often.
Using this technique the malicious web site is little affected by the removal of a single host. We find
fast flux in use by 11% of phishing web sites. Since there is no known reason for a legitimate web
site to use this technique, fast flux is a good feature for identifying malicious web sites. However,
since not all use it, other features are needed as well.
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DNS Wildcards
In Chapter 5, we examine DNS wildcards [41]. A DNS wildcard can be used to point arbitrary
requests for host names within a domain to a specific host name or IP address. Wildcards offer
administrators the convenience of not having to change DNS entries when host names change.
Wildcards are one of the original features of DNS, having been defined in the original standard.
As such, they have legitimate uses. However, they are also attractive to miscreants. Specifically,
wildcards help them evade blacklists by allowing them to use hundreds of host names without
changing DNS entries, thereby reducing the effect blacklisting a single host name has on their
activities. Although it is possible for miscreants to use many host names in a domain without
wildcards, the overhead would be higher, as they would need DNS entries for each. In this work,
we investigate malicious and legitimate uses of wildcards. We find wildcards to be in more use
by malicious sites than by good sites, with 75% of scam sites using them, as compared to 25% of
good sites. In the cases where good sites use wildcards, we find other features, such as the Time to
Live (TTL) associated with the wildcard record, that can help us distinguish good and malicious
wildcard uses. Although it may not be useful for identifying malicious web sites on its own, DNS
wildcards appear to be a good feature for identifying malicious web sites when used in conjunction
with other features.
Orphan DNS Servers
An orphan DNS server [40] is a DNS server which has an address record in the DNS system, even
though the domain in which it resides has no DNS records itself and hence does not exist. For
example, the DNS server ns.foo.com would be considered an orphan DNS server if foo.com is
a non-existent domain. Orphan name servers may arise from domains being deleted, without the
address records for name servers within the domain also being deleted. These name servers may be
left to account for other domains which may be using them. However, if the removal of the domain
was part of a take-down, then the other domains using these name servers are likely to be malicious
as well. In Chapter 6 we examine the uses of orphan DNS servers by both malicious and good sites.
We find 46.8% of domains using orphans indirectly associated with malicious activity. Because this
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association is indirect, and applies to fewer than half of domains using orphans, on their own orphans
are not a good indicator of malicious activity. However, we believe that due to the possibility of
them arising out of malicious activity, use of orphan DNS servers may be an effective feature when
combined with others.
Malicious Autonomous Systems
Malicious activity is not necessarily evenly distributed across the Internet: some networks may
employ lax security, resulting in large populations of compromised machines, while others may
tightly secure their network and do not have any malicious activity. In Chapter 7, we search for
disproportionately malicious ASes [43], the organizational units that comprise the Internet. In doing
so, we make an effort not to penalize large ASes for having more malicious activity simply due to
being large. We find certain ASes with more malicious activity than normal for their size. Although
legitimate web sites may be hosted in such ASes, association with such ASes should be regarded as
suspicious. Thus, we believe that the use of hosts in ASes with disproportionate malicious activity
can be used as a feature to identify web sites likely involved in malicious activity.
Web Redirects
The final provisioning feature we investigate, in Chapter 8, is the use of web redirects. A redirect
is a URL which immediately instructs the web browser to go to a different page. It has several
uses, including tracking the which links on a web site users click on. Redirects may be useful to
miscreants since they may appear to users as links to a web site the user trusts, but actually lead
them to a different web site under control of the miscreant. This investigation is in two parts, first
we investigate open redirects [93], and then redirects leading to malicious web sites. An open redirect
is one which may be manipulated to point to any destination. Such a redirect may be useful to an
attacker if the site the link appears to load to is a site users may trust. They can then be tricked
into clicking such a link which appears as if it would lead to a trusted page, but instead leads to a
page chosen by the miscreant. This can be especially dangerous of the miscreant designs their page
as a look-alike of the page the user thinks the redirect will lead to. We find that a large percentage
1. Introduction 8
of links identified as redirects by our heuristics are open, and thus can be exploited by miscreants.
We then investigate actual use of redirects to lead to malicious web sites, and find that over three
quarters of URLs in a phishing blacklist are redirects, much more than are found in a directory of
legitimate sites. This extensive use of redirects leading to malicious web sites indicates that they
would be a useful feature for identification of such sites.
1.3.3 Conclusion
We conclude the dissertation in Chapter 10 with a short summary of our findings. Although good
web sites are sometimes making use of some of the provisioning practices we explore, we find that
malicious sites are more likely to use them. Each of these light-weight features can be used to
identify a subset of malicious web sites. Additionally, each may incur false positives. Therefore, it
is likely to be beneficial to use them together, perhaps as features in a classifier. We plan to pursue
this direction in future work.
The investigation in this dissertation has led us to believe that a system based on our framework
would be a good first line of defense for combating web-based cyberfraud. However, crime on the
Internet is sophisticated and diverse. Given the variety of approaches taken by miscreants, no single
strategy alone is likely to be a perfect defense against all cyberfraud. For this reason, we envision that
our approach would be complementary to current anti-cyberfraud approaches, not a replacement.
Finally, we realize that the techniques miscreants use to evade detection and to stay alive in
the face of take-down attempts are likely to change over time. As they change strategy, some of
our features may become obsolete. However, evading all of the features described here would be
difficult in practice and take miscreant considerable time. Additionally, the spirit of our features is
fundamental to cyberfraud. Miscreants will always face the same underlying constraints: the desire
to be untraceable, and the need to face take-down attempts. As the strategies used by miscreants to
deal with these constraints evolve, the features in our framework also may be periodically refined,
with new ones added to deal with new provisioning strategies.
2Domain Name System
2.1 Introduction
The Domain Name System (DNS) [63,64] is an important component of the Internet’s infrastructure.
The primary purpose of DNS is to translate host names to IP addresses. Internet users rely on the
DNS every time they wish to address a host by its name. Three out of the five infrastructure
properties examined in this dissertation, DNS wildcards, orphan DNS servers, and fast flux, are
related to DNS. To understand these chapters better, in this chapter we present an overview of the
DNS.
2.2 DNS Structure
The DNS is a hierarchical system, organized as a tree. The entire DNS space is divided into various
zones. Each zone consists of a connected portion of this tree under the same administrative control.
This tree begins with the root zone, whose name consists of just a single dot (.). Directly above the
root are Top Level Domains (TLDs), zones such as .com or .de. Above these are zones for second
level domains, also referred to as domain names such as example.com or indiana.edu. This may
continue for several more levels.
In order to operate properly, each DNS zone must have at least one name server1 which serves
1The terms DNS server and name server are used interchangeably.
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the DNS records within that zone. Normally, there is more than one name server for a zone, with one
being designated as the primary name server and any others being designated as secondary name
servers. The primary server for a zone will load all the DNS records for the zone from a zone file.
Secondary servers will get this information through the zone transfer operation, which transmits all
of the DNS records in the zone, or they will load the same information from the zone file themselves.
The DNS servers at each zone store and respond to queries about hosts within their zone. They
also contain NS records pointing to the DNS servers for their subzones. Each dot in a host name
usually indicates a host in a zone or a subzone. For example, www.indiana.edu is a host within the
indiana.edu zone, while cs.indiana.edu is a subzone of indiana.edu. The indiana.edu name
servers will have records indicating the names of the cs.indiana.edu name servers.
2.3 DNS Records
Information is stored in the DNS in the form of records. DNS records consist of five basic parts,
numbered in Figure 2.1.
2 3 4 5
www.iub.edu.            50400   IN      A       129.79.78.186
1
Figure 2.1: Sample DNS record
1. The first component of a DNS record is the name. This is often a host name. The name (along
with the type and class) are used to look up the appropriate DNS record in a query. In the
example in Figure 2.1, the record would be returned for queries for in www.iub.edu. Such a
query would typically be made to get the address of the server when a user tries to visit this
web site.
2. The next component shown in this sample DNS record is the Time to Live (TTL). After
receiving the result of an DNS query, the local DNS server, and often the local computer,
cache the result to lower overhead for future queries for the same record. The TTL is the
number of seconds the record may be used from cache.
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3. The class field is little used. Although a few other values have been used in the past for various
purposes, all DNS records on the Internet are in the IN class.
4. The type field specifies what type of data the record contains. In this example, the type A
indicates that this record contains an IPv4 address. Details of other popular types will be
discussed in Section 2.5.
5. Finally, every DNS record contains some data. The structure of the data depends on the type
of DNS record. In this case it is an IP address, but can also contain another host name or
other information depending on the record type.
2.4 DNS Query Resolution
Each organization has two types of DNS servers. The first, internal DNS servers, typically referred
to as resolvers, are only for use by clients internal to the organization. The resolvers query remote
DNS servers on behalf of the clients and maintain a cache of the received responses. The second,
external DNS servers, typically referred to as authoritative DNS servers, only respond to queries
from remote resolvers for hosts belonging to the organization. Each zone in the tree must have a set
of authoritative DNS servers which answer DNS requests about the zone, and give the location of
authoritative DNS servers of its subzones. To prevent external clients from discovering the what DNS
queries are made by internal clients, and to prevent external clients from discovering internal network
structure, it is recommended to separate the resolver and authoritative DNS servers. Sometimes
both servers are on the same physical machine, but logically separated.
When a client needs a host name resolved, it contacts its local DNS resolver, whose address it
is configured with. When a resolver receives a client query to resolve a host name to an IP address,
it follows a series of steps to respond to the request. First, it consults its local cache. If it finds
an appropriate valid record for that information, it returns that record to the client. Such a record
may be in the cache if another client contacted the resolver earlier for the same record. Otherwise,
the resolver traverses the DNS hierarchy to satisfy the client request.
As an example, consider the case when the resolver has to consult the DNS hierarchy to find the
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IP address (A record) for www.iub.edu, because no records for this host name are in the cache. The
resolver contacts one of the root DNS servers, requesting the A record for www.iub.edu. It is able to
contact a root DNS server, because the addresses of these are static information, configured at the
resolver. The root DNS server does not know the address for www.iub.edu, but it does return the
address of the DNS servers for .edu. The resolver then queries the .edu DNS servers, once again
asking for the A records for www.iub.edu. It also does not know the answer, but returns the DNS
servers for iub.edu. Finally, these DNS servers are queried and the answer is returned. If some
intermediate information were cached, not all of these steps would be necessary. If the resolver has
cached the DNS servers for iub.edu, it can query these directly. If not, it is still likely to have the
DNS servers for .edu cached, saving the step of querying the root servers.
2.5 DNS Contents
In order to research malicious uses of DNS provisioning, we first undertook a study to understand
DNS contents in depth. We describe the study briefly here.
2.5.1 Data Collection
We use two data sets in this section. The first, zone transfer, was obtained by attempting to
transfer the zones listed in the .com and .net TLD zone files [109]. There were 65,101,733 second-
level domains in the .com zone file and 9,224,482 under .net zone file in June 2007, when we started
the data collection. Combined, these 74,326,215 domains represented about 58% of the 128 million
zones registered at the time [105].
The TLD zone files provide us a list of name servers for each of the second level domains they con-
tain. We attempted a zone transfer from each name server for each zone until we either successfully
transferred the zone, or the zone transfer failed for all its name servers. Additionally, if two zone
transfers from the same IP address failed, or upon request from the DNS server’s administrator, we
discontinued making further attempts to transfer any zone from that IP address. Upon connection
establishment failure, we retried once. This process took a total of three months. We succeeded in
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transferring zones for 4,947,993 (6.6%). We note that in popular DNS software, it is easy to disallow
zone transfer altogether, or allow transfer to only a specific set of IP addresses [37]. Therefore, any-
one who wishes to make their zone information private can easily make the information unavailable
to unauthorized clients. This is the likely cause of a majority of the failures.
One might argue that the zone transfer data set represents zones that are less security con-
scious because they allow a zone transfer in the first place. To compensate for this limitation, we
collect a second data set, dnssec. This data set is from security-conscious zones that deploy DNS
Security Extensions (DNSSEC) [6]. DNSSEC is a set of extensions to the DNS which provide origin
authentication and integrity to DNS data, and authenticated denial of existence. As a side effect, it
allows an enumeration of all host names in the zone. This process is slow but allows retrieval of all
the records in a zone, just like a zone transfer does. To build this data set, we began with a list of
862 zones with DNSSEC in production usage from the SecSpider DNSSEC Monitoring Project [78].
We limited this to the second level zones within the .com and .net TLDs to allow a fair comparison
with the zones we transferred data from in the same TLDs. This yielded a total of 124 zones.
Surprisingly, we also found 161 zones deploying DNSSEC in our zone transfer data. Since 96 of the
zones listed under SecSpider already existed in our zone transfer data, we only had to obtain data
from the rest of the 28 zones that did not allow a zone transfer.
We used the DNSSEC Walker tool [39] to collect this data. This tool relies on the presence of
NSEC or NXT records which should be present in zones deploying DNSSEC. These records provide a
way to discover all of the records from within a zone without using zone transfer. Of the 28 zones
we attempted to walk, 4 were only partially walkable due to missing some NSEC or NXT records. The
remaining 24 were completely walkable allowing us to get the same information as we would through
zone transfer without actually using the zone transfer query. Our final dnssec data set consists of
189 zones. The size of this data set is limited by the low deployment of DNSSEC.
2.5.2 Record Types
We now examine which DNS record types are most widely used among those domains from which
we were successful in obtaining a zone transfer. This helps us determine where to focus efforts in
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Figure 2.2: Number of DNS zones containing popular record types (log scale)
later DNS related studies.
We see DNS records of 42 types, including the invalid, obsolete, and experimental ones. The
most common are described in Table 2.1. Some, such as SOA, which contains basic information about
a zone, and NS, which provides the name of the DNS servers for the domain and its subdomains, are
seen in nearly every zone we examine. Interestingly, the SOA record, the only record type absolutely
required for a zone to exist, is the only one that we see in every zone. Even the vital NS is not
present in 0.2% of zones, even though it is required by the DNS specification, and despite the fact
that we know every one of these zones has at least one name server: the one we used to obtain the
zone transfer. Figure 2.2 depicts the number of zones containing each record type seen in 10 zones
or more.
From the figure we can see that the top five record types, SOA, NS, A, MX, and CNAME are much
more popular than the others. Material in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 uses the NS and A record type, with
Chapter 5 also using MX and CNAME. Although SOA is present in the most zones we do not consider
it, since it is not used for any known malicious purposes.
The next most popular record type after SOA is NS. This record is used to point to the DNS
servers for a domain as well as its subdomains. After NS, the next most popular record type is A,
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Type Description
SOA Indicates start of zone. Contact email, primary name server, default TTL,
default time zone is valid on secondary name server
NS Host name of name server
A IPv4 address
MX Host name, priority of email server
CNAME Domain name alias (single name only)
TXT Arbitrary text
HINFO Machine and operating system types
PTR Pointer. Most often used for reverse DNS
AAAA IPv6 address
RP Responsible person email and contact info
SRV Service discovery
LOC Location. Latitude, longitude, altitude, and precision
MB Host which contains mailbox for this domain name
WKS Services available at this domain name
MINFO Mailbox that should receive error messages for mailing lists at this domain
name
MR Mailbox rename, used for forwarding
MG Mail group domain name
MF Host that will forward mail for domain (obsolete)
MD Host that will deliver mail for domain (obsolete)
DNSKEY Public key used in DNSSEC
RRSIG DNSSEC signature
NSEC Next domain name in zone and record types at that domain name
NAPTR Rules for URI rewriting
KEY Public key for DNS transaction signatures
SPF Sender Policy Framework (email sender authentication)
A6 Experimental IPv6 address record type
DNAME Alias for domain name plus sub-domains
SSHFP SSH public key fingerprint
AFSDB Andrew File System (AFS) database location
Table 2.1: Description of DNS record type contained in 10 zones or more, ordered by popularity.
used to associate a host name with an IP address. The next most popular after these are MX and
CNAME. MX specifies the incoming mail server for a domain. CNAME aliases one host name to another.
2.5.3 Name Server Redundancy
A legitimate site should want its name servers to be redundant to preserve access to important
systems such as their web server if one of their DNS servers should go down. To mitigate the effect
of take-down attempts, miscreants may have more redundancy, as we will discuss in Chapter 4.
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Here, we briefly examine name server redundancy, to get a better idea of how much redundancy is
normally provisioned.
Every zone is required to have at least two name servers [63] and recommended to have at least
three [17]. This ensures availability of records when attacks or outages occur. 1,665 zones (0.03%) in
the zone transfer data list no name servers at all even though they are required to. Note, however,
that this does not make them inaccessible. Clearly, they are accessible since we transferred their
zone. Instead, it implies that their NS server records existed in their parent zone, but not in the
zone itself. This problem does not occur in the dnssec data. We find that it is most common to
have the required two name servers and no more. In the zone transfer data, 11.9% of zones list
fewer than the required two name servers, while 22.1% list more. The dnssec zones are provisioned
much better, containing only 3% of the zones with fewer than the required two name servers and
66% with more.
2.6 Discussion
While zone transfers yield valuable information for research purposes, the technique raises practical,
ethical, and legal questions. We encountered various reactions to our data collection efforts from
the zone administrators. Many of the early requests we received were concerns that a machine
had been compromised or that we were otherwise attacking their systems. However, over half of
the administrators that contacted us were supportive of the work, with a few being being quite
enthusiastic. A small number of them requested to have their servers exempted from the scanning,
which we promptly honored. The issue of zone transfers has reached the legal system. In a civil
court ruling which occurred after our data collection, a North Dakota civil court decision declared
unauthorized zone transfers in that state illegal [99]. While the circumstances in that case were
unique, it is clear that such queries can be viewed as controversial. Since IP address geo-location
software is not always accurate, determining if any servers we transfer from were in North Dakota,
or any other jurisdiction where zone transfers may be disapproved of by the legal system, would be
very difficult. For these reasons, we choose not to take advantage of zone transfer for later studies,
although it provides information that may be valuable which is not otherwise obtainable.
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Based on this study, we concentrate our investigation of DNS related features on features involv-
ing the NS, A, MX, and CNAME records. We also saw that most operators follow the requirement of
two name servers for a DNS zone, but do not provision extra redundancy beyond this requirement.
In Chapter 4, we will see a provisioning practice used for malicious activity where this requirement
is often greatly exceeded.
3Data Sources
The research in this dissertation is data-driven, and relies on data from many different sources.
In this chapter, we describe each of these data sources, broken down into data concerning likely
benign host names, data concerning likely malicious host names and addresses, and data that does
not distinguish between the two. Some are used for research presented in multiple chapters, while
others are only used once in the dissertation. When data sources are used in multiple chapters,
different snapshots of the data are used due to the times the studies were conducted. Not all data
sources were available for all studies. In all cases, we leave the specifics of how we use the data to
the chapters where the results based on it are presented.
3.1 Sources of Benign Hosts
DMOZ Our first source of benign hosts is the DMOZ Open Directory Project [15]. We use this data
source in Chapters 5 and 8. The Open Directory Project is a large directory of user submitted
Uniform Resource Locators (URLs). Its intended purpose is as a directory that can be used
to locate relevant web sites, as a substitute for using a search engine. Links in the directory
are categorized, although we do not take advantage of this categorization. Anyone can submit
a link to be added to the directory. They will not be added until approved by an editor. The
editors are volunteers, and must submit an application and be approved by senior editors.
While it is possible that some malicious links may be approved if the editors are themselves
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malicious, we do not believe this happens often, if at all. We have found only small overlap
between the hosts from this source and our sources of malicious information, which may be
due to the sites being hacked.
Alexa Another source of benign hosts are those from the Alexa Web Information Service [3]. We use
this data source in Chapter 8. This service ranks the most popular pages on the Internet, based
on the pages visited by users who install their toolbar, broken down into several categories.
Although it is possible for some of these sites to be compromised, since the top sites listed in
this service are those that are frequently visited, we expect that most are not malicious.
3.2 Sources of Neutral Hosts
Not all data sources contain only good URLs or only malicious ones. Those that contain a mix of
good and bad in general do not provide a way to tell which are good or bad. Since we do not know
if hosts in these data sources are good or bad we call them neutral.
Zone Files Our main source for neutral hosts are zone files from several Top Level Domains (TLDs).
Zone files are text files listing all DNS records directly contained in a domain. In the case of a
TLD, the zone file must have name servers listed for all of the domains contained in the TLD.
Thus, they can be used to obtain a list of all the domains in the TLD. In total, we use zone
files from seven TLDs: .asia, .biz, .com, .info, .mobi, .net, and .org [2,16,68,74,85,109].
We use this data in Chapters 5 and 6. A notable deficiency of this data is that it does not
include any Country Code Top Level Domain (ccTLD). Unfortunately, the operators of the
largest few ccTLDs are not willing to share such data for research purposes.
LocalDNS A second source of neutral hosts consists of hosts visited by computers on our departmen-
tal network. While most are likely to be benign hosts, we do not have any reason to believe
that nobody has visited malicious sites. To create this data set, we captured all the Domain
Name System (DNS) queries issued on our departmental network, anonymized so we could
not tell which computer was requesting which host names. We then extracted the host names
contained in queries for IP addresses. We use this data in Chapter 8.
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3.3 Sources of Malicious Hosts
Although we criticize blacklists for being reactive and incomplete, they are also the only available
source for malicious hosts. Therefore, our malicious data sources mainly consist of several blacklists.
We organize them below by the type of malicious activity they are meant to track.
3.3.1 Phishing Sites
We have used four different feeds of phishing URLs, provided by MarkMonitor [55], PhishTank [77],
the Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG) [5], and the Google Safe Browsing API [24].
MarkMonitor The URLs in MarkMonitor’s feed are obtained from various large e-mail providers
and Internet Service Providers (ISPs). To verify them, MarkMonitor passes them through a
filter which performs URL and content analysis and determines the likelihood that the URL
is pointing to a phishing site. For URLs with a high probability of being phishing URLs,
MarkMonitor performs a manual check on the URL. The unique, positively identified URLs,
are recorded along with the brand they target in their phishing feed. We use this feed in
Chapter 4.
PhishTank PhishTank is a community-driven reporting system for phishing emails. The URLs in
this feed are either user submitted or obtained via external feeds. The user-submitted URLs are
voted upon for verification purposes. Submitted URLs must be verified by multiple individuals
before they will be listed as a verified phishing page. All maintenance of this feed is handled
on a volunteer basis. We use this feed in Chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7.
APWG The APWG is a group consisting of both research universities and several organizations from
industry, all with an interest in tracking and stopping phishing. The URLs in this feed come
from various sources including spam traps, consumer complaints, and brand owners. Some of
the URLs in this feed are hand verified, some are verified by external communities, and some
are automatically processed. While the feed allows us to determine which are which, we use all
the URLs from the feed regardless of how they were verified. We use this feed in Chapters 4,
5, 6, and 7, and 8.
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SafeBrowsing One additional blacklist of phishing hosts we make use of is the data available through
the Google Safe Browsing API. This list, however, can not be used in the same manner as
others. The only data available is hashes of phishing URLs, not the phishing URLs themselves.
Because of this, we can not use this as a source of URLs, but it is still useful to check if a
given URL is malicious. We use this data in Chapter 6.
3.3.2 Spam/Scam Sites
We use two lists of URLs contained in spam messages, one from SURBL [102], and the other
from Support Intelligence [101]. Additionally, we supplement this with URLs extracted from spam
messages received locally.
SupportIntelligence Our feed from Support Intelligence is updated every six hours. This feed
contains URLs from spam as well as associated IP addresses. Although this feed is very large,
certain scams are very heavily represented. At times over half of the URLs in the feed have
pointed to a single scam. However, there is still sufficient variety in the feed to make it useful.
We use this data in Chapters 6, and 7.
SURBL SURBL also collects domain names from URLs contained in spam. Although they typically
only allow users to perform lookups on the domain names in their list, we have also arranged to
receive the associated IP addresses from them as well. These IP addresses are those associated
with the domain itself, and with the domain with www prepended. This feed is updated once
per day. We use it in Chapters 5 and 7.
LocalSpam Our final source of scam URLs consists of URLs extracted from spam received at the
Indiana University Computer Science email server. All emails are passed through the Sophos
PureMessage [94] spam detection system. URLs are extracted from those marked as spam to
create this data set. We receive the list of URLs daily. This data is anonymized, we do not
know which URLs were destined to the same user, or any content of the email messages. We
use this data set in Chapter 7.
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3.3.3 Spam Senders
SBL IP address blacklisting can be used on mail servers to prevent compromised machines from
sending mail directly. Spamhaus runs the most widely-used blacklist in this context, the
SBL [98]. The SBL mainly contains IP addresses of machines verified as spam senders. Addi-
tionally, when known spam operations move to new hosts, corresponding entries are preemp-
tively added. This list can be queried by mail servers when they receive connections to block
known spammers. We obtain a copy of this blacklist every hour, and extract the IP addresses.
We use this data set in Chapters 6 and 7.
3.3.4 Exploited Hosts
XBL Spamhaus also maintains a second blacklist, known as the XBL [96]. This list contains prefixes
(often individual IP addresses) of hosts infected with exploits often used to send spam. This
includes open proxies, computers infected with viruses that are known to send spam, and other
exploits. This data is updated every half hour. We use it in Chapters 6 and 7.
3.3.5 Malware Distribution Hosts
Four of our data sources contain URLs of sites distributing malware. These are eSoft [18], the Clean-
MX Viruswatch Mailing List [73], Malware Patrol [54], and the Google Safe Browsing API [24].
CleanMX The Clean-MX Viruswatch mailing list sends out URLs hosting malware, along with IP
addresses and what specific malware was seen. The list formerly updated every 15 minutes,
but now updates much more sporadically. We use this data source in Chapters 5, 6, and 7.
MalwarePatrol Malware patrol discovers URLs hosting malware through two methods. They accept
user submissions, but they also crawl the web actively looking for malware hosting sites. Their
list is updated hourly. We use it in Chapters 5, 6, and 7.
eSoft Similarly, eSoft also collects URLs of malware. Unlike the others, they also send out a sample
of the malware along with the URL. However, we do not make use of this. We use this data
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source in Chapters 5, 6, and 7.
SafeBrowsing The Google Safe Browsing API’s malware feed is similar to its phishing feed, in that
it does not contain URLs of malware directly. Instead it contains hashes, and is therefore not
useful as a source of malicious URLs but can be used to check if a given URL is malicious. We
use this data in Chapter 6.
3.3.6 Bot Command and Control
ShadowServer Botnets consist of groups of compromised machines used for malicious purposes on
the Internet. Miscreants often use them for sending spam and for hosting phishing and scam
sites. While we do not possess any direct sources of botnet IP addresses, many of the addresses
in our other data sources are likely to be bots since bots are commonly used for malicious
activity. However, botnets must get their instructions from their bot masters, often through
command and control servers, which distribute orders. The ShadowServer Foundation [92]
provides lists of botnet command and control servers along with their IP addresses. We use
this data in Chapter 7.
4Fast Flux
4.1 Introduction
A provisioning strategy known as fast flux has recently been popular among miscreants on the
Internet. Miscreants use this technique to provide extreme availability of their fraud web sites in
the face of take-down attempts. A web site exhibiting fast flux typically resolves to a large number
of IP addresses, each with a low Time to Live (TTL), meaning that each is valid for use by clients
for only a short period of time. Successive resolutions of the site often lead to a new set of IP
addresses, increasing availability. At the same time, the short validity of these addresses ensures
that the operators of these web sites can provide a new, up-to-date list of machines hosting these
sites. Combined, these fast flux features help keep fraud campaigns afloat longer despite take-down
efforts.
Fast flux comes in various flavors. The term is most commonly used to refer to the case when
the web server name of a fraud-related site resolves to large number of IP addresses with short
validity. In the rest of this chapter, when we refer to fast flux, it is meant in this sense. However,
even the Domain Name System (DNS) server that leads clients around the world to the web server
could exhibit flux. Further, this phenomenon could continue all the way into the DNS hierarchy of
the domain associated with fraud. To distinguish between the case when a web server exhibits flux
from one where its DNS servers exhibit flux, the latter activity is referred to as DNS flux. The term
double flux refers to the case where fast flux and DNS flux are occurring together.
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Previous work has shown that many scam web sites utilize fast flux [30, 47]. However, little is
known about the use of flux in phishing campaigns. In this chapter, we study fast flux, DNS flux,
and double flux in the context of phishing. Although we do not study flux in the context of malware
sites, they would benefit from using it as well, so it may also be a useful feature to identifying them.
We use an Support Vector Machine (SVM) [9] classifier on real-world data to produce models
which can identify all types of flux. Using our mechanism, we find that phishing campaigns utilize
fast flux, as well as DNS flux, although less often than web sites connected to spam. We also find
that double flux helps ensure the longevity of phishing campaigns more than just fast flux. Our
findings suggest that the ability to detect flux will be useful in fighting various kinds of cybercrime.
We go beyond simply examining the prevalence of flux in phishing. In contrast to prior work
which simply checks if flux can be detected using a list of features [30,80], we perform feature selection
to determine which of the features we examine is actually helpful in identifying flux. Additionally,
we examine the practicality of detecting flux in real time, without causing significant performance
degradation of web browsing. Finally, in order to determine the true size of fast flux campaigns, we
perform clustering on the fast flux hosts. This exercise reveals several interesting insights about the
relationships among fluxing machines.
The key results of the work in this chapter are:
• Prevalence: 11% of the web servers hosting phishing sites exhibit fast flux. 62% of the DNS
servers in use by phishing sites exhibit DNS flux. In fact, 78% of the web servers exhibiting fast
flux were pointed to by DNS servers that themselves exhibited DNS flux. Thus, most of the
phishing web servers that exhibited fast flux were also a part of a double flux infrastructure.
• Clusters of Fluxing Machines: When clustering host names exhibiting fast flux based on 50%
commonality of the IP addresses they point to, we find just 12 clusters of just fast flux host
names and 25 of DNS flux. This suggests that many of the fluxing hosts are working together.
We find that hosts within a cluster are named using similar patterns, which also hold across
some of the clusters.
• Accuracy: Unfortunately, identifying DNS flux is harder than identifying fast flux. While fast
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flux can usually be identified using the set of addresses returned from a single DNS resolution,
DNS flux is harder to identify, requiring at least 10 resolutions for reasonable accuracy.
• Performance: Classifying a host name as fluxing or not would add 0.78% overhead to a typical
DNS resolution, implying that the classification proposed in this paper could be realistically
implemented at the client.
4.2 Data Collection
To collect data to investigate flux, we use the three near real time feeds of phishing Uniform Resource
Locators (URLs) described in Chapter 3: MarkMonitor, PhishTank, and APWG. Each URL in the
feeds belongs to a phishing web site. From the URLs in these feeds, we extract a list of web server
host names. We then perform several DNS queries on each host name. We look up the A records
corresponding to the host name, and the NS records for each domain and subdomain contained in
the host name. Then, we also look up the A records for each DNS server for this host discovered in
the NS lookups.
For example, if the feed contained the host name www.xyz.example.com, we would look up A
records for www.xyz.example.com. We would also look up the NS records for www.xyz.example.com,
xyz.example.com, and example.com, Finally, we would look up the A records corresponding to each
of the NS records returned from the three NS requests.
We perform each DNS resolution periodically, once every 15 minutes. We choose this interval
because the caching duration for most fluxing records is shorter than 15 minutes. This avoids
receiving answers for queries about fluxing domains from the local cache. We continue attempting
DNS resolutions for each host name as long as they are in our data feed or the resolutions are
succeeding. We stop attempting the resolve a host name if the host name is no longer in our data
feed and the resolutions have failed for one full day.
In order to accurately infer the presence of flux, we collect several other pieces of information for
each IP address discovered above. First, we perform geo-location using the IP2Location [29] software.
This helps in inferring which countries the phishing infrastructure is located in. Additionally, we
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Web Server DNS Server
Resolved host names 15, 547 77, 568
IP addresses 15, 230 26, 214
Autonomous systems 1, 851 4, 602
BGP prefixes 5, 212 10, 605
Countries 106 128
Table 4.1: Overview of data used for fast flux detection
use Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) routing tables from routeviews [76] to determine the BGP
prefix and Autonomous System (AS) for each IP address. All of these can be used as indications
of how far apart the set of IP addresses corresponding to a host name are from each other, either
geographically or in terms of network structure. We expect that legitimate web sites using multiple
IP addresses will have the IP addresses grouped together in the same AS, while malicious sites will
not due to use of botnets.
4.2.1 Overview of Collected Data
We collect data for a period of one month (31 days) starting August 1, 2008. The feeds contain
53,154 URLs. Sometimes, multiple URLs in the feed contain the same host name. These URLs
correspond to 30,450 host names. We were able to resolve 15, 547 (51.1%) of these, details of which
are shown in Table 4.1. The rest were likely taken down by the time they appeared in our feed. The
resolvable host names lead to 15, 230 IP addresses. Even though some web servers are hosted on
many IP addresses, many share some of their IP addresses. The result is that the web server names
are close in number to the IP addresses.
Also shown in Table 4.1, the 77, 568 DNS server names used by the phishing sites correspond
to just 26, 214 IP addresses. In many cases the web server name did not resolve, so we could not
determine if the site used fast flux, but we were able to obtain NS records. If we exclude these
cases, including only the ones where the host of the web site was still available at the time of our
measurements, there were 46, 889 DNS server host names with 7, 529 IP addresses.
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4.3 Detecting Flux
Our goal is to identify flux in phishing data. Having collected the data described above, we now
apply a machine learning algorithm to this problem.
4.3.1 Methodology
Given the IP addresses from one or more resolutions of a host name and associated DNS servers,
we would like to determine whether fast flux, DNS flux, or double flux is occurring. Toward this
goal, we apply SVMs, a class of machine learning algorithms. SVMs produce a data partitioning in
the form of a hyperplane which simultaneously minimizes the classification error and maximizes the
geometric margin between the partitions. This hyperplane can be thought of as the “line” between
the partitions which is “farthest” from all of the partitions simultaneously. Upon training an SVM
on a given set of data, one gets a model which separates the data into two classes using a partition
that minimizes error and maximizes the margin between the classes. This model can be used to
rapidly classify new data points.
The SVMs operate on vectors each representing a data point, containing the value for all the
features, and the appropriate class if the data is being used for training. Making use of a kernel
function, data is mapped into a higher dimensional space, where the optimal hyperplane separation
is found via optimization methods. The particular library used for this work, libsvm [9], uses the
radial basis function (RBF) kernel by default. For the purposes of this work, the defaults within
libsvm were chosen in all cases, and accepted best practices were used for scaling the data, and
training and validating the model.
Using the parameters described subsequently in Section 4.3.2 we train two SVMs, one to deter-
mine fast flux, and the other to determine DNS flux. Determining double flux is straightforward
once fast flux and DNS flux are detected. We select 10% of the data at random to train the SVM.
This training includes a ten-fold cross validation to ensure a consistent model, unbiased by any
particular subset of the data. In order to train the SVM, we need pre-classified data points. For this
pre-classification, we apply a heuristic to this 10% based on the observation that fast flux host names
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have an ever-increasing number of IP addresses returned on successive resolutions. Over time, the
number of IP addresses greatly outstrips all cases where flux is not present [30].
Once we have completed the pre-classification, we ensure that there is a good mix of fluxing
and non-fluxing hosts in the training data. It is important to be careful not to misclassify sites
using Content Distribution Networks (CDNs), since similar to fast flux hosts, they are known to
return a relatively large number of IP addresses corresponding to a host name, each with a short
validity. However, CDNs generally do not return as large a number of IP addresses as flux networks
do, and the number of IP addresses returned by CDNs generally does not grow as quickly with the
number of resolutions performed. In order to ensure that our models handle the CDN case correctly,
we add to the training data 13 popular, legitimate sites in the Internet that use CDNs. The end
result of training the SVMs is a model which can be used to partition the data into the two classes:
“flux”/“not flux”. Training a model for DNS flux follows an identical process to training for fast
flux. In this case, the heuristic checks if the DNS servers have an ever-increasing number of IP
addresses built up from successive resolutions.
4.3.2 Parameters Used
To determine the occurrence of each type of flux, we explore a range of parameters. Some of these are
common to other works in the area [8,30,71,80] though these works only explore them in the context
of fast flux and do not investigate DNS flux or double flux. There are two major differences in how
we construct our model as compared to these works. The first difference stems from our choosing
to only use parameters that can be easily and accurately derived. Thus, we avoid parameters based
on the Internet whois database, which contains owner and other related information about domains
but is sometimes unreliable [34]. The second difference is that we strive to derive the smallest set of
parameters required for inferring each type of flux with highest accuracy. Specifically, we consider
the following parameters:
• Number of IP addresses (nIP ): The biggest indicator of any kind of flux is the total
number of IP addresses obtained as the result of resolving a host name. Thus, we use the
total number of IP addresses obtained from all DNS resolutions of a host name as our first
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parameter. However, non-fluxing servers may have large numbers of IP addresses for other
reasons, so other parameters must be considered.
• Number of ASes to which those IP addresses belong (nAS): Generally, all the IP
addresses corresponding to a host name co-exist in the same AS, as the host is maintained by
a single administrative entity. Even for CDNs, results from a single vantage point exhibit the
same behavior. However, this is not true for fluxing hosts, simply because the bot armies of
compromised machines that they host their sites on typically belong to multiple ASes. Thus,
if the resolved IP addresses belong to many ASes, we take this to be a possible indication of
flux.
• Number of prefixes to which those IP addresses belong (np): BGP Prefixes are
continuous groups of IP addresses announced from a single AS. The reasoning behind looking
at IP prefixes that the resolved IP addresses belong to as an indication of flux is similar to
that behind looking at the number of ASes. The IP addresses corresponding to legitimate
hosts usually belong to a handful of BGP prefixes per host name while this is unlikely to be
true for networks exhibiting flux. Thus, if a host name belongs to many BGP prefixes, this is
a possible indication that it is fluxing.
• Number of countries to which those IP addresses belong (nc): Even though many
domains are hosted in multiple countries, individual hosts reside in a single country in most
cases. In fact, the hosts belonging to a particular country code top level domain (ccTLD)
would in most cases be located on IP addresses physically residing within that country. Due
to this fact, if a host name belongs to multiple countries, we take it to be a possible indication
of flux.
• Number of DNS servers corresponding to web servers (nNS): Typical web servers
generally are associated with only a handful of DNS servers. This number is typically two
for most web servers in the Internet, as seen in Chapter 2. Web servers exhibiting fast flux
typically have many more associated DNS servers [30]. Thus, we take a large number of DNS
servers corresponding to a web server as a possible indication of fast flux. Notice that this
parameter is not applicable to DNS flux detection.
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• Short average TTL (TTL): Fluxing hosts typically use a shorter average TTL on their IP
addresses than legitimate hosts. This is because miscreants want to avoid the possibility of
client resolvers caching them. The shorter the TTL, the faster a host can change its A records.
Thus, we consider a short TTL as a possible indication of flux. We use TTL as a binary
parameter in our model, using a threshold of 10 minutes.
4.4 Prevalence of Flux
We are now in a position to answer the question: How prevalent are fast flux, DNS flux, and double
flux in phishing?
First, to detect fast flux, we trained an SVM on 10% of the data using the complete set of
parameters discussed in Section 4.3.2. We then applied the trained SVM to the remaining 90%
of the data. We found that 11.4% (1,733) of the web servers that were alive at the time of our
measurements exhibited fast flux. This percentage was recently observed to be 30% in the context
of web servers hosting scam sites pointed to in spam [30]. Interestingly, these 11.4% web server
names corresponded to 45.5% of the phishing IP addresses in our data. Clearly, the fluxing web
servers cycle through a large number of IP addresses.
Next, as we did for fast flux, we trained a SVM classifier on 10% of the data to infer the presence
of DNS flux in the remaining data. In this case, we used all the parameters except nNS , the number
of DNS servers corresponding to a web server. This parameter obviously does not apply to DNS flux.
For web server host names which contain multiple sub-domains, we looked for DNS flux at all levels
up to the second level domain name, as described in Section 4.3. We found that 61.7% (47,889) of
DNS servers exhibited DNS flux. Most of the phishing host names with DNS flux, 67.7%, had only
their immediate DNS server fluxing. The remaining 32.3% had DNS server host names fluxing at
multiple levels of the DNS hierarchy. This protects them against clean-up of any of the hosts they
uses as web servers or any of those they are using as DNS servers.
Clearly, more DNS servers flux than the web servers, both in absolute numbers and in percentage.
It is counter-intuitive that more DNS servers should flux than even the web servers that they point
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to. To gain a better insight, we looked at the IP addresses corresponding to the fluxing DNS servers.
Surprisingly, there were only 904, indicating that while many DNS server names exhibit flux, they
correspond to far fewer actual machines.
Finally, we looked for the presence of double flux in our data. We found that 77.6% of the
fluxing web servers were part of a double flux network. This implies that most of the times when
phishing infrastructure fluxes, it fluxes in all possible ways. In fact, in 98.8% of the double-flux cases,
the associated DNS servers were fluxing at multiple levels of the DNS hierarchy. These percentages
imply that a large percentage of the phishing campaigns are very well-provisioned against take-down
efforts, for they exhibit flux both at the web server granularity as well at various levels of DNS-server
hierarchy.
4.4.1 Impact of Parameter Set
Our initial SVM model for fast flux was created with all six parameters, while the one for DNS
flux used five. We now test which parameters offer the best accuracy without being redundant. We
produce SVM models with all combinations of parameters, and compare their results to the full
model.
Parameters for Detecting Fast Flux
We begin by examining how web servers with and without fast flux fare for each of the six parameters
discussed in Section 4.3.2. Specifically, in Figure 4.1, we show the Cumulative Distribution Function
(CDF) of fast fluxing and non-fast fluxing web servers for each of the parameters (with the exception
of TTL, for which we show a Complementary CDF (CCDF)). We see that for each parameter, there is
a very clear difference in the lines plotted for hosts with fast flux and those without it. Approximately
80% of non-fluxing web servers have a single IP address, belong to a single BGP prefix, and a single
AS, while 90% belong to a single country. Additionally, 85% have at most two DNS servers, and
over 60% have an average TTL of longer than 10 minutes. In contrast, among the web servers that
exhibit fast flux, only about 2% are in a single AS, prefix, or country, fewer than 20% have two or
fewer DNS servers, and fewer than 20% have average TTLs of longer than 10 minutes. Clearly, each
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of the parameters offer promise in helping the detection of fast flux. We now investigate which ones
identify the most fluxing servers (low false negatives) without misclassifying non-fluxers (low false
positives).
In order to determine the least set of useful parameters, we create SVMs to classify phishing web
servers with all the parameters, and sequentially peel off a parameter at a time. If there is little
to no change between the presence of the parameter and absence of the parameter, it was deemed
to be of no additional discriminatory value over the parameters still present. In this fashion, we
can determine the minimum set of parameters necessary for classification with good accuracy. A
comparison of models with 3, 4, or 5 features to the full 6 feature model is shown in Table 4.2.
Models with fewer features in general performed worse than those shown.
We find that the combination of four parameters, {nIP , nAS , np, nc} produces results with
relatively few misclassifications. It has only three false negatives (fluxing hosts classified as non-
fluxing) out of the 1,773 total fluxing hosts, and still maintains low false positives (non-fluxing hosts
classified as fluxing). We conclude that all six parameters are not required to detect fast flux. This
four parameter model is used for results throughout this chapter.
Parameters for Detecting DNS Flux
We repeat the same process we used to investigate which parameters were useful in fast flux for
DNS flux. We find that several models do well. Somewhat surprisingly, the classifications with a
very simple model are almost as good as with the full one. The single parameter model with just
nIP has only 2 false negatives and 10 false positives as compared to the full model. We conclude
that just nIP is sufficient to detect DNS flux.
4.4.2 How Many DNS Resolutions Are Enough?
One of the identifying characteristics of fast flux and DNS flux is that a new set of IP addresses
may be returned at each resolution. Typically, as the number of resolutions increase, so do the
total number of IP addresses seen. This implies that having results of multiple DNS resolutions
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Figure 4.1: Cumulative distribution function of each parameter used in fast flux detection for fluxing
and non-fluxing web servers
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Feature List Flux False Neg. False Pos.
All features 1, 773 − −
nASN , np, nc, nNS , TTL 1724 51 0
nIP , np, nc, nNS , TTL 1726 50 1
nIP , nASN , nc, nNS , TTL 1699 76 0
nIP , nASN , np, nNS , TTL 1792 7 24
nIP , nASN , np, nc, TTL 1784 0 9
nIP , nASN , np, nc, nNS 1783 1 9
np, nc, nNS , TTL 1646 129 0
nASN , nc, nNS , TTL 1623 152 0
nASN , np, nNS , TTL 1814 0 39
nASN , np, nc, TTL 1726 49 0
nASN , np, nc, nNS 1336 466 27
nIP , nc, nNS , TTL 1682 93 0
nIP , np, nNS , TTL 2293 0 518
nIP , np, nc, TTL 1775 11 11
nIP , np, nc, nNS 1135 649 9
nIP , nASN , nNS , TTL 1826 0 51
nIP , nASN , nc, TTL 1712 69 6
nIP , nASN , nc, nNS 1710 74 9
nIP , nASN , np, TTL 1788 1 14
nIP , nASN , np, nNS 1781 7 13
nIP , nASN , np, nc 1781 3 9
nc, nNS, TTL 0 1775 0
np, nNS , TTL 1764 14 3
np, nc, TTL 1674 101 0
np, nc, nNS 1712 63 0
nASN , nNS, TTL 1688 87 0
nASN , nc, TTL 1618 157 0
nASN , nc, nNS 1607 168 0
nASN , np, TTL 1797 1 23
nASN , np, nNS 3100 0 1325
nASN , np, nc 1816 0 41
nIP , nNS , TTL 1849 5 79
nIP , nc, TTL 1682 93 0
nIP , nc, nNS 1715 66 6
nIP , np, TTL 1777 48 50
nIP , np, nNS 1830 1 56
nIP , np, nc 1765 21 11
nIP , nASN , TTL 1804 0 29
nIP , nASN , nNS 1794 1 20
nIP , nASN , nc 1697 84 6
nIP , nASN , np 1773 11 9
Table 4.2: Impact of parameters used on false positives and negatives in classifying fast flux
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is useful in accurately identifying the presence of flux. In this section, we investigate the issue of
how many DNS resolutions are sufficient to provide enough information to accurately distinguish
fluxing host names from non-fluxing ones. The answer to this question has important implications
for the applicability of our technique at clients. Requiring fewer, possibly one, DNS resolutions to
infer flux can help the DNS resolver of the client protect the client from visiting a malicious site.
If the technique requires more than one, then it is higher overhead, and the detection is no longer
practical in real time for the client to use as a defense mechanism.
Resolutions for Inferring Fast Flux
In order to determine the marginal returns on successive lookups, we constructed SVM models using
the best (minimal) parameter set for fast flux, {nIP , nAS , np, nc}, and data obtained for each from
one to ten DNS lookups. The output of each model was compared to the model constructed in
Section 4.4.1, which used all resolutions performed for each web server, with all six parameters.
Specifically, we look for false positive rate – classification of good hosts as fast flux, when they were
not – as well as false negative rate – classification of fast flux web servers as non-fast flux, for each
model.
As seen in Figure 4.2(a), only a very small benefit is gained from using multiple resolutions. While
the misclassification appears to be very erratic, the maximum misclassification rate is approximately
0.64%. Among the small number of misclassifications we do see for a single DNS resolution, there
are more false negatives than false positives. This is desirable because we wish to avoid penalizing
good hosts. Because even with one DNS resolution, misclasifications are low, we conclude that a
single DNS resolution is sufficient to classify a given web server name as fast flux or not. This further
implies that this method could easily be integrated in an anti-phishing filter at the client itself or
its DNS resolver.
Resolutions for Inferring DNS Flux
Here, we investigate if multiple resolutions are required for identifying DNS flux. The outcome here
is quite a bit different than that of fast flux. Specifically, Figure 4.2(b) shows that with only one DNS
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Figure 4.2: Effect of varying the number of DNS resolutions on the accuracy of fast flux and DNS
flux identification
resolution on DNS servers, we see over 25% misclassifications. This is far higher than the maximum
for fast flux. Even with ten DNS resolutions, we still see 2% misclassification, an order of magnitude
more misclassification than in the case of fast flux. Fortunately, most of the misclassifications are
false negatives, not false positives, implying that good DNS servers are rarely flagged as fluxing
while fluxing DNS servers are missed more often than desired. We conclude that identifying DNS
flux with fewer resolutions is significantly more difficult than identifying fast flux.
The obvious question is why DNS flux is so much more difficult to identify than fast flux. We
find two reasons for this. First, because secondary DNS servers are often provisioned as backups, a
legitimate DNS server host name in our data is much more likely than a web server host name to
have multiple IP addresses in the same country, averaging two IP addresses per country instead of
one. For the same reason, it is also somewhat more likely to have multiple IP addresses in the same
AS and prefix. Second, while we see a large difference in the median number of IP addresses returned
for non-fast flux web servers and fast-flux web servers, 1 versus 14, this difference is not present for
fluxing and non-fluxing DNS servers. Instead, the median number of IP address records returned
for both of these is 1, indicating that the fluxing DNS servers are only fluxing sometimes, not every
time we look them up. These differences are likely the major causes of the difficulty identifying DNS
flux domains with a low number of lookups.
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Figure 4.3: Comparison of the lifetimes of double flux, fast flux only, and non-fluxing phishing
domains lasting 10 or fewer days
4.5 Flux and Fraud Longevity
Given that some phishing campaigns set up their infrastructure with fluxing hosts, an obvious
question that comes to mind is: Does flux help with the longevity of fraud campaigns? We look at
the length of phishing campaigns with and without flux to gain an insight into this question.
In Figure 4.3, we show a comparison of lifetimes of domains associated with phishing. We focus
on domains that last shorter than 10 days after being blacklisted. Though this cut-off is somewhat
arbitrary, the reasoning behind ruling out domains that last longer is to avoid being biased by those
domains that remain unnoticed by those performing take-downs for a long period of time, perhaps
because they are less effective. The phishing web servers in such domains will continue to operate
irrespective of whether or not they exhibit any form of flux. We divide the domains in Figure 4.3
into three categories: those whose servers do not exhibit any kind of flux, those whose web servers
exhibit fast flux but no DNS flux exists, and those that exhibit both fast flux and DNS flux (double
flux).
The curves in Figure 4.3 are somewhat of a surprise: domains with just fast flux last for shorter
duration than those without any form of flux. Specifically, while 65% of the phishing domains without
flux last longer than a day, only 20% of domains with just fast flux manage to live more than a day.
On the other hand, double flux seems to help with fraud longevity, for 83% of domains with double
flux survive more than a day. Clearly, when deciding to provision the phishing infrastructure with
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flux, it pays more to provision it with double flux than just fast flux.
In reasoning why domains with just fast flux fare worse than those without any form of flux, we
recognize the recent attention that fast flux has received from commercial enterprises [8, 71]. This
could be leading to faster detection and take-down of domains that exhibit fast-flux characteristics.
DNS flux on the other hand has been described [104] but not studied, other than in this article. This
may help those using DNS flux. Given that removing the DNS servers for a domain is a possible
way of taking it down, a large number of DNS servers that frequently change and are not under the
same administrative control make take-down more difficult.
Figure 4.3 shows another interesting aspect: While double flux provides benefits to the longevity
of phishing campaigns in the short term, it seems to be detrimental in the long term. Specifically,
only 20% of phishing domains with double flux last for more three days while close to half of those
without any form of flux last more than three days. The question becomes: Why does double flux
become detrimental in the long run? We conjecture that the difficulty of taking down double flux
domains keeps them up in the short term, but the fast-flux behavior attracts more attention in the
long run.
4.6 Top Fluxers
To get a better idea of the activity surrounding a flux campaign, we now specifically examine the
largest fluxing operations in our data. Specifically, to determine which fluxing hosts belong to the
same groups of miscreants, we perform clustering of the web server host names based on their IP
addresses. We perform this clustering separately for the double flux web servers and those with just
fast flux. For the double flux, we also cluster the name server host names. Toward this goal, we first
compute the Jaccard distance [38] between each pair of host names by looking at the IP addresses
they have in common. Let IPhi and IPhj be the sets of IP addresses of hosts hi and hj. Then Jaccard
distance for each pair of hosts, hi and hj , is given by: J(IPhi , IPhj ) =
|IPhi∪IPhj |−|IPhi∩IPhj |
|IPhi∪IPhj |
We then apply the single-linkage clustering [38] technique to examine which host names end
up in the same cluster. The single-linkage clustering uses distance, D(X,Y ), between each pair of
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clusters, X and Y , and hierarchically combines the clusters with the smallest distance (or greatest
commonality, where commonality is 1−D(X,Y )). In our case, we start with each host belonging to
its own cluster and use minimum Jaccard distance between hosts in separate clusters to hierarchically
combine the clusters using this technique. Depending on the threshold we use to combine clusters,
we end up with a variable number of clusters.
4.6.1 Characteristics of Just-Fast-Flux Networks
We find 22% of fast flux host names have just fast flux without DNS flux. We clustered these web
server host names based on their IP addresses. Table 4.3 shows the number of clusters we get when
we combine clusters based on various levels of commonality. A small level of commonality may exist
by coincidence, or by the same host being infected more than once and thus a member of multiple
botnets. Any more than a few IP addresses in common probably does indicate a real connection
between the host names. While a lower threshold would likely still be showing actual relationships,
we conservatively focus the remaining analysis on the clusters at the 50% commonality level, which
has 59 clusters.
Commonality > 0% 10% 25% 50% 75% 90%
Clusters 18 21 34 59 92 198
Table 4.3: Number of clusters of just fast flux host names based on the percentage of IP addresses
they share
We first focus on the host names in the largest cluster. This cluster contained 83 host names. All
of the host names were very similar and targeted three different banks. An anonymized example is
[bank].webbiz.wirebiz.globalupdate.certificateupdate.updatesessioniotzsisc2c226fo
.configlogin.comreportid.[domain].com, where in the real host name, [bank] and [domain] are
replaced with the name of a bank and a domain name.
The other names in this cluster are all similar to this example in several ways. All of them
contain a large number of labels (between nine and eleven), with some individual labels in common.
All have updatesession or Updatesession followed by 15 random characters in the same position.
All of them also have the bank name as the first or second label. We see a few host names in each
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domain name. The rest of the labels between the domain name and updatesession, and one label
after it, change for each host name. The remaining labels are always the same for each host name
which is targeting the same bank. This shows that the IP addresses are not the only relation between
the hosts names in a cluster, they use similar naming conventions as well.
This single large cluster is not the only one which follows a similar pattern. The four largest
clusters and the 7th largest, along with a few smaller ones, all follow similar patterns. The 5th largest
follows a similar pattern, only with CommunityID follows by nine digits instead of Updatesession.
These clusters together account for 67% of the just fast flux domain names. Based on the large
number of similarities in these clusters, it is likely that all of the just fast flux phishing falling into
these clusters is due to a single group or a single kit.
These clusters share other characteristics as well. Normally, each label in a host name represents
a level of the DNS hierarchy, so with 9-11 labels, these host names would be expected to have 9-11
levels of DNS servers. Instead we see something quite different. They are not declaring different
DNS servers at each level of the hierarchy. In fact, the only level that has a DNS server is the
domain name itself. Beyond the domain name, the entire remaining 7-9 labels are being served out
of the DNS server at that level. This would ease administration, since under this system, many
fewer DNS records would have to be created to make a new host name with a different set of the 7-9
labels beyond the domain name. Each cluster also only uses a small number of DNS servers, always
named ns1 and ns2, in 1 to 5 domains per cluster.
4.6.2 Characteristics of Double-Flux Networks
The remaining 78% of fast flux host names also exhibit DNS flux, together known as double flux. To
see the relationships among web servers, with double flux, we perform the same clustering we did for
those with just fast flux. The number of clusters at various levels of similarity is shown in Table 4.4.
Looking in slightly more detail at the case where we require a commonality of at least 50% between
a pair of web server host names in different clusters in order to combine the clusters, we see a large
degree of infrastructure sharing, with only 12 clusters. The largest three clusters account for 45%,
23% and 23% of the double flux host names, or 1/3, 1/6, and 1/6 of all fast flux host names.
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Commonality > 0% 10% 25% 50% 75% 90%
Clusters 1 3 5 12 158 1010
Table 4.4: Number of clusters of double flux host names based on the percentage of IP addresses
they share
We begin by looking at the largest double flux cluster. This cluster contained 615 host names.
All of the host names in this cluster followed a single pattern. An anonymized example is ww9.
[bank].com.[domain].su. [bank] represents a real bank name and [domain] represents a domain
name.
The hosts in this cluster are all in the .su Top Level Domain (TLD). The [domain] label takes
two forms. It is often three to four letters followed by a number. When it is not that, then it is
always two words put together with one of the words being update, verify, or confirm. The label
which in our example is com, appears to be an attempt to trick the user by making it look like that
label and everything to the left of it is a legitimate domain name. The only variation we see in this
label within this cluster is sometimes co.uk us used in place of com. In this cluster [bank] is always
one of three different banks.
We often see several very similar host names appear, identical except for the leftmost label, and
often with only the digit in this label changed (such as ww9, ww8, ww7...). Much of the time, we see a
set of names all identical except for this digit appear in our data feeds all at the same time. However,
sometimes we see the variants with some digits appear on one day, but some are missing from the
set. Those with the missing digits appear in our feeds several days later. We conjecture that in
this case all these host names likely went into use at the same time, but some were not detected as
phishing and submitted to our feeds until later. Sometimes, the missing variants never make it to
our feeds at all. In this case, we conjecture that the missing variants likely really do exist and are
being used, they have just not been detected yet. These patterns may be used to generalize entries
in blacklists.
We also see a distinct pattern in the names of DNS servers used by the hosts in this cluster. All of
the host names have 19 or 20 DNS servers with names consisting of ns{1-20} appended to the front
of the exact host name. Further, this pattern is repeated at each level of the domain hierarchy. This
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makes it appear that they have a highly redundant DNS system, but further investigation reveals
that this is not the case. We first look at the IP addresses of each DNS server for the host name, and
compare to the set of IP addresses for all the DNS servers for the name. Nearly all of the servers
ns{1-20} for each host name have 90% commonality with each other with regards to the set of IP
addresses they point to. Put another way, they all refer to the same sets of physical servers.
We also look at consistency up the levels of the DNS hierarchy. We compare DNS servers’ IP
addresses for all the DNS servers for a host name with those of the level above, and find all the host
names have at least 61% of DNS server IP addresses in common with the level above, and 49% use
all the same IP addresses as the level above. This indicates the same DNS infrastructure is used at
every level, but with different host names assigned to it. This is perhaps to avoid detrimental effects
of individual DNS server or even all of the DNS servers for a host name getting blacklisted. Since
the different names really are the same server, then if the DNS server for the level above is asked
for the IP address of the phishing site, it will still be able to answer.
We now move on the other double flux clusters. Looking at the naming conventions, we find that
the host names in all except for one of the double flux clusters follow a very similar naming pattern,
the only changes being the addition of one more bank, and changes in the TLD being used. For
example, the second largest cluster targets all four banks seen, and the domains are all in the .ru
(Russia) or .co.uk (United Kingdom) TLDs. Other behaviors in these clusters are also similar to
the largest one, such as how they provision their DNS servers. They all use the same scheme where
every host name uses 20 DNS servers with names consisting of ns1-ns20 prefixed to the host name,
and all pointing to similar sets of actual servers. Together, these similarities suggest that 99.5% of
the double flux we see is due to a single group or a single kit.
4.7 Discussion
We have seen that it is practical to detect fast flux using a single DNS resolution. This could be done
either at end hosts, or by a centralized system proactively searching for malicious sites. We also see
that miscreants taking advantage of flux are using a large number of host names. The use of many
IP addresses and many host names makes these attacks difficult to completely block using current
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methods. However, since they all use flux our method of identifying them using infrastructure
features would be far more effective.
We analyzed the performance of the necessary operations to detect flux on a computer with a
2.4GHz Intel Core 2 Duo processor and 4GB of RAM. We compiled the code with the gcc compiler
using high optimization levels. Timings were conducted on 4, 770 host names and no caching was
used to improve performance in the face of IP address overlap. Given the sheer amount of overlap
in IP addresses among hosts, such a cache should improve performance. The time required for
classification alone was 15.09µs per classification. More time was used building the data point to
classify, which involved the IP to AS mapping and geo-location. When the time to build the data
points was included, the average time rose to 1.286ms per host name. To put these numbers in
perspective, we conducted DNS resolutions. The goal was to compare the extra overhead flux-
detection calculations would incur on median DNS resolution time. We found the median DNS
resolution time to be 164ms over 2.9 million unique DNS resolutions. We conclude that a check
for flux on each DNS resolution would then typically add only 0.78% overhead on top of the DNS
resolution that must be made anyway to reach the web site.
Retraining the SVM is an important consideration for our system in practice. While we never
retrain our SVM, we only analyze a month of data. In a practical system, retraining periodically
would be necessary to keep up with changes in fast-flux behavior, especially attempts to avoid
triggering this system. This retraining would likely not have to be done often, so it would add little
overhead. If these checks were implemented at the end user system, the system would not necessarily
have to deal with retraining. Instead, training could be done centrally, with a new SVM model then
downloaded periodically by end systems.
5DNS Wildcards
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we examine wildcards, one of the original features of Domain Name System (DNS)
defined in the original standard. The role of wildcards in DNS is a many to one mapping, allowing
all names within a single domain or subdomain to map to a single value, for example one IP address.
Recently, Netcraft released two advisories that point to the use of wildcards in setting up phishing
campaigns [62,69]. Wildcards may be attractive to miscreants because they allow mapping multiple
host names in their campaigns to the same IP address, for example. This can be useful in evading
host name based blacklists, which rarely contain all host names belonging to a fraud campaign, with
minimal effort.
Our primary goal in this chapter is to survey wildcard usage among benign, malicious, and
neutral domains in the Internet. Within malicious uses, we consider scam, phishing, and malware
web sites. Toward this goal, we query approximately 8 million domains for wildcard entries in the
four most popular DNS record types. Since wildcards have legitimate benign uses, we also examine
possibilities for distinguishing malicious uses of wildcards from their benign uses. The ability to do
so may be helpful in identifying and effectively blacklisting malicious domains.
Working towards these goals, we arrive at the following key results:
• Prevalence: We find that a surprisingly large percentage of Internet domains use wildcards.
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Specifically, 25-75% of domains in various data sets use wildcards, making this a much more
popular DNS feature than we expected.
• Type: An overwhelming majority of domains using wildcards use them in their A records,
which map arbitrary host names to IP addresses.
• Uses: Prominent users of wildcards include domain-parking businesses that wish to mone-
tize unregistered domains and subdomains, web-hosting companies, and blogging and social-
networking sites.
• Malicious sites: Malicious sites also make extensive use of wildcards, with spammers leading
the pack with 75% of the scam-related domains in our data wildcarded.
5.2 Background
Wildcard records provide a simple method to map all host names within a domain or subdomain
to a single DNS entry, as opposed to the one to one mapping provided by a non-wildcarded DNS
record, or the few to one or one to few mappings that can be achieved through multiple records
containing either the same name or the same data. Many use cases for wildcards could be dealt with
without them by having many records all pointing to the same data. However, such records would
be difficult to maintain, so wildcards provide increased convenience.
Wildcards in DNS were first defined in RFCs 1034 [63]. Later, RFC 4592 [50] updated and
clarified the specification, providing more details and examples of intended behavior, and the in-
teractions of wildcards with specific record types. A wildcard record is a DNS record of any type
with a minor change to the name portion of the record. In a wildcarded DNS record, instead of
the name being an exact host name, its least significant (leftmost) label in the name consists of a
single asterisk character, as shown in Figure 5.1(a). Conceptually, the asterisk matches one or more
labels at the left end of the DNS name. In this example, the *.foo.com is being used in place of
mail.foo.com and ns1.foo.com. When a DNS query is made for mail.foo.com, seeing no match,
the server will return results for *.foo.com, substituting mail for the *. Specific records override
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A 129.79.245.53www.foo.com
foo.com MX mail.foo.com
foo.com
mail.foo.com A
NS ns1.foo.com
129.79.247.191
ns1.foo.com 129.79.247.191A
(a) without wildcards
A 129.79.245.53www.foo.com
foo.com MX mail.foo.com
foo.com
A
NS ns1.foo.com
129.79.247.191*.foo.com
(b) with wildcards
Figure 5.1: Example of DNS provisioning of a domain with and without wildcards
the wildcard records. Since the record for www.foo.com is still present, the wildcard would not be
considered when responding to a query for this host name.
The client receiving a DNS response cannot directly tell if the response was generated from a
wildcard record or not; their use is transparent to the client systems. If a query for host name
name.foo.com were matched from the wildcard record *.foo.com, the name on the record returned
in the response will still be name.foo.com instead of *.foo.com as it is stored on the DNS server.
We can however still tell if a wildcard is in use by directly querying for the wildcard name, in this
case, *.foo.com. Since the wildcard record is the only one that would match such a query, if a
response is given to such a query, it would let us know a wildcard record is present. Note that
wildcard matches only work on one direction. Although the query for *.foo.com looks like the
client has a wildcard in the query, it will only match an explicit wildcard record, not an arbitrary
name in foo.com on the server.
5.3 Data Sets
Our goal is to study DNS wildcard usage in three contexts: domains judged as worthwhile or useful
by Internet users, which we consider to be benign; domains from several blacklists, which we consider
to be malicious; and a large general collection of domains, including both good and bad domains.
Table 5.1 shows an overview of the data sets.
The first context in which we study wildcards is the domains determined to be useful by users
in the Internet. For this purpose we use the DMOZ dataset described in Chapter 3. We assume
that those links submitted and approved are those someone has judged to be worthwhile, and are
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DMOZ Zone Files PHISHING MALWARE SPAM
Start Date Sept. 17 Sept. 27 Sept. 22 Sept. 22 Sept. 22
End Date N/A N/A Oct. 21 Oct. 21 Oct. 21
Frequency Once Once Daily Daily Daily
Hosts 3,038,928 N/A 16,496 18,570 N/A
Domains 2,737,326 5,536,475 10,575 12,854 548,041
TLDs 3,235 7 306 259 327
Table 5.1: Overview of data sets used for investigating DNS wildcards
therefore unlikely to be malicious. We consider 2.7 million domains contained in this data set on
September 17th, 2009.
The next context in which we study wildcards is domains known to be associated with malicious
activity. For this context, we use host names extracted from the APWG and PhishTank phishing feeds,
eSoft, MalwarePatrol, and CleanMX malware feeds, and SURBL spam feed, all described in detail in
Chapter 3. We examine each of these feeds every day for a period of 30 days, extracting a total of
571,470 domains that were alive at the time of our receiving the feed. We refer to these data sets
respectively as PHISHING, MALWARE, and SPAM throughout this chapter.
The last context we consider is a large general list of domains on the Internet. We obtain this
list through the use of the seven generic top level domain zone files in our Zone Files data set,
described in more detail in Chapter 3. Specifically we use zone files from .asia, .biz, .com, .info,
.mobi, .net, and .org. There were 110,728,143 domains contained in these TLDs, on September
27th, 2009, 58% of the total 192 million domains in the Internet at the time [108]. From these, we
randomly sample at a rate of 5%, or 5,536,475, which we examine in this chapter.
5.4 Wildcard Prevalence
Wildcards can occur at all levels of the DNS hierarchy. We concentrate first on the domain level.
We also briefly examine wildcards at the subdomain level.
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DMOZ Zone Files PHISHING MALWARE SPAM
Domains
Checked 2,737,326 5,536,475 10,575 12,854 548,041
Active 2,717,186 4,861,053 9,044 11,312 226,060
Inactive (%) 0.73% 12.2% 14.5% 12% 58.7%
Wildcards
total % 24.52% 45.15% 32.09% 31.39% 75.10%
% A 18.76% 42.72% 27.79% 26.59% 72.30%
% NS 0.32% 5.53% 0.20% 0.19% 1.60%
% MX 5.72% 6.44% 4.10% 6.14% 6.83%
% CNAME 3.40% 3.75% 3.37% 4.49% 2.34%
Table 5.2: % of active domains with wildcards of each record type in each data set
5.4.1 Wildcards at the Domain Level
We look for wildcards in four DNS record types: A, NS, MX, and CNAME. From the entries in each data
set, we determine the domain name part of each host name using the Public Suffix List [67]. For all
domain names in these data sets, for example, foo.com, we query for *.foo.com for the four record
types. All queries were run once for each domain in the DMOZ and Zone Files data sets, but daily
for the others that changed often in real-time. We also query for the NS record for each domain to
ensure that the domain exists at the time of the query.
A large fraction of domains we surveyed used wildcards. Table 5.2 presents an overview of the
number and types of wildcards present in each data set at the domain level. Between 1/4 and 3/4
of domains use wildcards, with the DMOZ data set showing the least prevalence of wildcards and
the SPAM data set showing the most. Not only is the A wildcard overwhelmingly popular, its usage
mimics general wildcard usage trends. Some domains have more than one type of wildcard, causing
the percentages in the last four rows of Table 5.2 to exceed the total percentage of domains using
wildcards.
5.4.2 Wildcards at the Subdomain Level
We now examine if wildcards are commonly used for subdomains as well. A domain can have multiple
levels of subdomains. We can only infer wildcard usage for subdomains contained in host names
present in our data sets. For example, if a data set contains the host name a.b.c.example.com
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DMOZ PHISHING MALWARE
Domain wildcarded 0.3% 4.0% 2.3%
No domain wildcard 0.1% 1.3% 0.6%
Table 5.3: Percent of wildcarded and non-wildcarded domains containing wildcarded subdomains
we could query for wildcard entries *.a.b.c.example.com, *.b.c.example.com, *.c.example.com,
and *.example.com. We look for subdomain wildcards in the three data sets where host information
is available: DMOZ, PHISHING, and MALWARE.
Table 5.3 shows the results of the subdomain level wildcard analysis. The first row of the table
shows the number of wildcarded domains that had subdomain wildcards in the three data sets. The
second shows the same information for non-wildcarded domains. Malicious domains are more likely
than benign ones to have subdomain wildcards. However, overall there are not many wildcarded
subdomains in our data. Even when domains have subdomain wildcards, they do not apply this to all
of their subdomains. On average, counting only domains with any subdomain wildcards, domains
in PHISHING, MALWARE, and DMOZ have 68.5%, 46.9%, and 33.7% of their subdomains wildcarded
respectively. Because of the low number of domains containing subdomain wildcards, we focus only
on domain level wildcards for the rest of this chapter.
5.4.3 Overridden Wildcards
Some wildcards may be overridden by specific entries. Exact matches for a query override wildcard
matches. When a DNS query would have both an exact match and match a wildcard as well, the
response is only constructed based on the exact match. The wildcard is in this case not considered at
all. For example, a domain foo.com, may have a wildcard entry for *.foo.com, and a more specific
entry for host name a.b.foo.com. This allows the domain to point a.b.foo.com to a different value
than any other host name matching *.foo.com. Now that we have seen how often wildcards are
occurring, an important consideration is if they are overridden by a more specific DNS entry.
Toward the goal of identifying overrides, we proceed as follows. For the DMOZ, PHISHING, and
MALWARE data sets where we have host names in the feeds, we query the DNS for A and CNAME
records corresponding to the host names and check if the results of this lookup match the results of
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DMOZ Zone Files PHISHING MALWARE SPAM
A 10.7% 31.6% 19.0% 19.9% 6.7%
CNAME 17.4% 8.8% 17.5% 30.0% 2.8%
Table 5.4: Percentage of A and CNAME wildcards being overridden by specific entries
the wildcard lookup. If they are not the same answers, we consider the exact match to be overriding
the wildcard. If we have multiple host names for one wildcard, we count it as an override if any of
them do not match the wildcard entry. For Zone Files and SPAM, we do not have exact host names,
so we simply prepend www to the domain name. Though we do not know for sure that the host name
so generated is in use, it is commonly used for web servers and may catch some overrides.
Notice that since our data sets are for web servers only, they do not contain name servers or
mail servers. As a result, we cannot establish the presence of overrides for MX and NS wildcards by
querying each domain for MX and NS wildcards and comparing the result to host names in the feed.
This limitation is not severe since as seen in Table 5.2 MX and especially NS wildcards are not widely
used.
Table 5.4 shows the percentage of A and CNAME wildcards being overridden in each data set.
Wildcards are overridden in 2.8-31.6% of cases. The SPAM data set sees the least overrides. Some
data sets witness overrides for CNAME wildcards more often than those for A wildcards and vice versa.
The difference is most striking for the Zone Files data set. Examining the overrides in this data set
closely, we find that 25.4% (557,949) of wildcards in the Zone Files data set are hosted on name
servers in domaincontrol.com. Of these, 99.7% are A wildcards being overridden by a specific CNAME
record. These account for 88.9% of the overrides of A wildcards in this data set. If we ignore wildcard
entries on this name server, only 6.6% of remaining A wildcards in this data set are overridden, much
closer the percentage of overridden CNAME wildcards in this data set. We conclude that wildcards
are not frequently overridden in most data sets.
5.5 Wildcard Usage
In the previous section, we examined the prevalence of wildcards. Now we investigate their specific
uses by the good, bad, and neutral. To group related wildcarded domains, we considered several
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Figure 5.2: CDF of wildcarded domains served by each DNS server domain
options such as by Top Level Domain (TLD) and by Autonomous System (AS), and found it best
to aggregate them by the DNS servers serving them. This grouping most intuitive out of those
we considered because providers of DNS services, for example hosting companies, often provide a
default configuration which most domains may choose. Similarly, large organizations running many
of their own domains are likely to use similarly-provisioned servers. In fact, we aggregate even more
by grouping wildcarded domains in terms of the domain of the DNS server.
5.5.1 Wildcard Usage Among Good Domains
The first data set we analyze is DMOZ, our set of good domains from a user edited directory. From
this data set, we saw a total of 666,334 domains (24.5%) using wildcards. These were served by
DNS servers belonging to 28,883 domains. Figure 5.2 shows a CDF of the wildcarded domains and
the corresponding DNS server domains for this and Zone Files data sets. We discuss the latter in
Section 5.5.2. A key observation from this Figure is that just a few DNS servers are responsible for
a disproportionate number of wildcarded domains. Specifically, 29.1% of domains in the DMOZ data
set are served by just top ten DNS server domains.
We now consider the top ten DNS server domains serving the most wildcarded domains. Table 5.5
shows the total domains and wildcarded domains served by each. In looking over the domains
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Domains Wildcarded
served domains
worldnic.com 55,947 48,484
rzone.de 47,913 47,771
yahoo.com 23,194 21,835
namespace4you.de 17,611 17,409
kasserver.com 13,313 13,227
name-services.com 17,529 10,595
b-one.nu 9,471 9,406
ipower.com 9,058 9,057
register.com 13,853 8,077
mediatemple.net 7,869 7,705
Table 5.5: Top 10 DNS server domains serving the most wildcarded domains in the DMOZ data set
accounting for most wildcard usage, we find that all are operated by registrars or web-hosting
providers. Both these entities tend to provide a default configuration to users which includes a
wildcard record. This setup is useful because it reduces the support the registrar has to provide to
a novice user. The user does not need to configure a DNS record for the host name he wants to use
because they will all be taken care of by the wildcard. Even users who override these with specific
records for individual hosts may choose to keep the wildcard record.
5.5.2 Wildcard Usage Among a General Collection of Domains
We now change our focus to the Zone Files data set, a large collection of domains taken from
several TLD zone files. In this data set, we saw 2,194,565 domains using wildcards (45.2%). These
domains are also served by a small number of DNS server domains, only 32,644. Overall, we find
that wildcarded domains are even more concentrated at a few name server domains than in the DMOZ
data set; 58.9% of wildcarded domain in this set are served by name servers in 10 domains. Table 5.6
shows the top ten name server domains serving the most wildcarded domains in the Zone Files
data set. Four of the domains listed are in common with those in Table 5.5.
100% of the domains served by sedoparking.com and dsredirection.com are wildcarded.
These two, along with the two others that have the highest percentage of wildcarded domains,
fabulous.com and parked.com, belong to companies involved in domain parking: the domains
server no actual useful content, just a template page filled with ads redirecting the user to other
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Domains Wildcarded
served domains
domaincontrol.com 1,138,877 557,949
name-services.com 179,130 147,697
worldnic.com 137,696 116,759
sedoparking.com 96,790 96,789
dsredirection.com 91,796 91,796
yahoo.com 82,747 80,669
register.com 72,827 62,137
secureserver.net 62,672 60,063
fabulous.com 39,166 39,137
parked.com 37,529 37,522
Table 5.6: Top 10 DNS server domains serving the most wildcarded domains in the Zone Files data
set
pages, mainly for the purpose of monetizing chance-visitors to the domain. Wildcards are very useful
for parked domains. By directing visitors to a parking page, they allow monetization of all possible
subdomains of a domain. However, not all parked domains are wildcarded. At least one provider of
parking services we know of serves over 700,000 domains but uses wildcards on below 1% of them.
The other major user of wildcards in this data set are web-hosting providers, as we saw in DMOZ. In
fact, four of these are the same ones we saw in the top 10 from the DMOZ data set.
5.5.3 Wildcard Usage Among Bad Domains
Next, we look for wildcard usage in bad data sets, PHISHING, MALWARE, and SPAM. As we saw in
Table 5.2, 32.1% of active phishing domains, 31.4% of active malware hosting domains, and 75.1%
of active spam domains were using wildcards. Spam senders are using a far greater proportion of
wildcards than anyone else, although all of these are using wildcards in significantly higher propor-
tions than we saw for the good domains in DMOZ, which had 24.5%. Clearly the miscreants have
figured out the flexibility offered by wildcards. For each domain used in their phishing, scam, and
malware campaigns, they can simply swap a blacklisted host name with a new one without doing any
extra maintenance of their DNS entries. This helps them defeat blacklists, which are often based on
exact host names instead of domain names because the latter can incur false positives by penalizing
good host names within a domain serving malicious campaigns. The proportion of PHISHING and
MALWARE domains we see with wildcards is lower than what we saw in Zone Files (45.2%). This is
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Domains Wildcarded
served domains
ixwebhosting.com 151 151
nshost.com.ve 139 139
rzone.de 63 60
yahoo.com 98 55
name-services.com 54 47
hosteurope.com 100 44
worldnic.com 48 42
hrnoc.net 33 32
register.com 32 30
namebay.com 128 29
Table 5.7: Top 10 DNS server domains serving the most wildcarded domains in the PHISHING data
set
Domains Wildcarded
served domains
freeservers.com 203 203
ixwebhosting.com 93 92
ipower.com 83 83
name-services.com 101 81
northsky.com 73 73
everydns.net 173 67
yahoo.com 63 59
servage.net 58 57
sorpresor.com 51 51
sitelutions.com 54 49
Table 5.8: Top 10 DNS server domains serving the most wildcarded domains in the MALWARE data
set
likely because of the prevalence of parked domains in Zone Files, who seem to be a major user of
wildcards.
The top ten DNS server domains serving wildcarded domains in PHISHING, MALWARE, and SPAM,
are shown in Tables 5.7, 5.8, and 5.9. They account for 21.67%, 22.95%, and 21.82% of the wildcard
domains in these data sets respectively. This indicates a slightly lower concentration on the top
name servers than we saw in the DMOZ data set, and much lower than we saw in the Zone Files
data set.
Another key observation from these tables is that many of the top-10 domains serving wildcarded
domains are shared across all data sets. One reason for this commonality is domain parking. Some
of the name server domains from the SPAM data set are associated with domain parking, and are
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Domains Wildcarded
served domains
name-services.com 16,699 14,764
tutby.com 6,167 5,966
domainservice.com 4,640 4,555
domainsite.com 3,202 3,200
domaincontrol.com 6,278 2,045
dsredirection.com 1,778 1,777
sedoparking.com 1,323 1,323
netstandardconsulting.com 1,296 1,296
peak-communications.net 1,180 1,180
dzcamera.net 941 940
Table 5.9: Top 10 DNS server domains serving the most wildcarded domains in the SPAM data set
probably there due to spam domains that have been taken down but still appear in our data set.
These are fewer than 5% of the wildcards in SPAM so are certainly not the primary reason it has
a higher proportion of wildcards than the others. Others are present because they are hosting
providers. The most prominent example of this is name-services.com, which appears in the top
ten from every data set. This and the few others from the three malicious data sets that are also top
users in the other data sets may be large providers of malicious wildcards just because they are large
providers who use wildcards by default and miscreants happen to use them. However, a majority
that are the top users in these three data sets are not among the top users in the other two, making
it likely that the miscreants are configuring wildcards intentionally.
Churn of Hosts Among Bad Wildcarded Domains
Miscreants can exploit the flexibility of wildcards to their advantage by simply swapping a blacklisted
host name with a new one without having to change DNS entries. This can be a useful in evading
blacklists, which are based on exact host names today. We now attempt to determine if such is the
case. To do so, we examine if new host names matching an existing wildcard entry are being added
to our feed of bad data sets over time. In this analysis, we focus on the PHISHING and MALWARE data
sets, since the SPAM data set only includes domains, not host names.
Toward this goal, we calculate the daily churn of host names for each wildcarded domain in
PHISHING and MALWARE data sets. For this, we compare the host names for a domain with those
5. DNS Wildcards 57
Figure 5.3: CDF of churn rate of malicious domains over 30 days
listed the previous day. The sum of the additions and deletions is the churn rate for the day. We
average this over all days the domain is alive. We do not count the initial set-up or take-down of the
domain since some domains may have existed before or continued to exist after our data collection.
Domains only seen for one day are also not counted since there is no second day to compare to to
derive a churn. Figure 5.3 depicts the CDF of churn over a period of 30 days.
For the PHISHING data set, the average churn rate is 0.64, a little more than one change every 2
days, and the maximum is 52. For malware, the average is 2.87 with a maximum of 32.5. Clearly,
these numbers indicate that miscreants whose domains are active for more than a day, especially
those serving malware, are taking advantage of the wildcard records to use new host names over
time.
5.6 Identifying Malicious Wildcard Usage
Thus far, we have seen that wildcards are in wide-spread use among all types of domains in the
Internet. Even though some types of bad domains use wildcards more commonly than good or
neutral domains, there are no clear trends that would distinguish wildcard usage among such domains
from others. The primary reason for this is that the largest wildcard users are domain registrars
and web-hosting providers and many of them are common across all data sets. This is somewhat
unsurprising, given that a recent report examining phishing attacks from the first half of 2009 [89],
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Figure 5.4: TTLs for A records in each data set
found that only 14.5% of domains used in phishing were actually registered by the phishers, the
remaining were compromised domains that could belong to a known service provider.
In this section, we examine three additional features to help disambiguate wildcard usage by bad
domains from other types of domains. First, we examine Time to Live (TTL) values on wildcard
DNS records. Then we examine ASes corresponding to the wildcarded domains. Finally, we use the
Google search engine to determine how many host names it knows of matching each wildcard, and
to discover new hosts matching known wildcards.
5.6.1 TTLs of Wildcarded Records
To distinguish malicious uses of wildcards from good ones, we first examine the TTLs for each type
of wildcarded records, and compare them across the three data sets. We focus on A wildcards, since
they were the most common type. A histogram of TTLs for A records is shown in Figure 5.4.
A few TTLs are most popular: 5 minutes, 30 minutes, 1 hour, and 1 day. The most significant
difference we see between data sets is PHISHING has a large spike at 30 minutes. In general, we find
that wildcards in the PHISHING, MALWARE, and SPAM data sets have shorter TTLs than those in good
and neutral data sets, with 30 minutes and 1 hour being most popular values for bad wildcarded
domains. This is intuitive because shorter TTLs allow miscreants to quickly update the IP addresses
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corresponding to malicious host names. Given the benefit to miscreants of strategies that rely on
short TTLs such as fast flux, described in Chapter 4, examining TTLs corresponding to wildcarded
records appears to be a promising avenue for investigation.
5.6.2 Autonomous Systems Pointed to by Wildcards
Many of the malicious domains are hosted on bots in geographically diverse Internet locations. ASes
are one way to measure this diversity. The second feature we examine to distinguish malicious from
good wildcards is how often are IP addresses corresponding to wildcard records are spread over
multiple ASes. This is straightforward to do for A wildcards, since the right hand side of these
records directly provides an IP address. For CNAME, MX, and NS records, which point to a host name
instead of an IP address, we simply resolve the hosts on the right hand side to IP addresses. For all
wildcard types, we see some difference in the results across various data sets, however, we focus on
A and CNAME wildcards in this discussion since these show the greatest difference, enough that they
are useful in detecting many cases of malicious wildcard usage.
A histogram of the ratio of Autonomous System Numbers (ASNs) to IP addresses for wildcarded
A records is shown in Figure 5.5(a). The most notable observation here is that a majority of SPAM
wildcard domains with multiple IP addresses have a ratio of ASNs to IP addresses between 0.6 and
0.7. Very few of the good data sets are in this range. In fact, PHISHING and MALWARE A wildcards
are much more likely than Zone Files and somewhat more likely than DMOZ to be in the 0.9 to 1.0
range.
Figure 5.5(b) shows the ASN/IP ratio for wildcarded CNAME records. Here, the SPAM data set
almost all ends up in the 0.9-1.0 range, while fewer than 10% of the wildcarded CNAME records from
the good data sets do so. Phishing and malware sites are significantly more likely than good ones
to fall into the ranges from 0.1 to 0.4.
Overall, this method looks like a good one for identifying wildcards associated with spam sites,
and a decent one for wildcards associated with phishing and malware sites. The only issue with it is
that it relies on the wildcard entry pointing to multiple IP addresses, since otherwise, the notion of
geographical diversity makes no sense. This happens for 1.6 - 4.2% of domains with CNAME wildcards
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(a) A
(b) CNAME
Figure 5.5: Ratio of number of ASNs associated with each wildcard A and CNAME record to number
of IP addresses pointed to by record
and 0.5 - 27.2% of A wildcards depending on the data set. In the SPAM data set, it happens for 18.2%
of A wildcards and 41.2% of CNAME wildcards. This data set is also the one where the ratio is most
different from the good data sets, indicating that it would be effective a significant amount of the
time for identifying wildcards associated with spam.
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DMOZ Zone Files PHISHING MALWARE SPAM
Domains checked 6,717 9,867 1825 2321 4,057
Domains responding 6,587 4,596 1089 1263 475
% indexed 98.1% 46.6% 59.7% 54.4% 11.7%
Table 5.10: Wildcarded domains from each data set queried at Google
5.6.3 Host Names Represented by Wildcards
Technically, a wildcard entry in the DNS can match any host name. However, in practice, a site
may only use some of these host names. The number of host names in use matching each wildcard
is the third feature we examine to distinguish malicious from good wildcard uses.
Blogging and social networking sites often provide a subdomain for each user. Out of 170 such
sites we investigated, 52 support subdomains for each user. Of these 52, all do so using wildcard
entries, 37 of them with A wildcards, and the rest with CNAME. As a specific example of this, Windows
Live Spaces provides a subdomain for each user, all handled by a single wildcard entry, and claims
175 million users [61]. Even the smallest blog site we have found using wildcards supports over
10,000 subdomains.
We now investigate if Google searches can reveal new host names covered by our wildcards.
Toward this goal, we queried the Google search API [23] for a sampling of the domains with A or
CNAME wildcards from each data set, using site restriction to make sure all responses were from the
domain we were interested in, not external pages with the domain in their text. This gives us an
idea of how the wildcard is being used, subject to a maximum of 64 results imposed by the Google
API. Table 5.10 shows how many domains were queried from each data set, and what percentage
were found in the Google index.
We find that a large percentage of domains we queried were indexed by Google. Over half from
Zone Fileswere not indexed, probably due to the large amount of sites devoid of useful content, such
as parking pages. On the other hand, over half of the pages in two of our sets of malicious Uniform
Resource Locators (URLs), PHISHING and MALWARE were indexed. From SPAM, a large majority were
not indexed by Google. This is perhaps because the URLs associated with them are only linked
through email, so the Google crawler would have never seen them. Also note that not being indexed
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(a) All Host Names (b) New Host Names Only
Figure 5.6: Cumulative percent of wildcarded domains in each data set with the given number of
host names found in the Google index
does not necessarily mean Google has not crawled the page. It is possible for Google to intentionally
exclude pages with known malicious content. Since so many of the malicious domains are found by
Google, the presence of a domain in the Google index can not be used to reliably determine if a site
is malicious or not.
Out of the domains that did return Google results we examine how many results were returned.
Results are shown in Figure 5.6(a). The most notable result here is that wildcards from PHISHING
correspond to a higher number of hosts known by Google than wildcards from other data sets. For
the other data sets, meaningful distinctions are hard to make, since SPAM and Zone Files results
are similar to each other, as are MALWARE and DMOZ. While it can not be said with certainty that
wildcards representing large numbers of host names are associated with phishing, it is certainly an
indication that further scrutiny is required to see if they are phishing sites. While a client could not
directly determine the number of hosts a wildcard represents, any organization who crawls the Web
should be able to provide data on how many host names they have seen in a domain name, making
this check practical.
Figure 5.6(b) shows how many host names Google returned that were not found in our data
sets. Here, only those data feeds that contained host names are considered since no conclusions
can be drawn from data sets containing only domain names. For most domains Google indexed
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in the PHISHING and MALWARE data sets, it knows of several host names not in our data set. This
indicates that blacklisting could be improved by directly including wildcard entries instead of exact
host names. Additionally, there is significant difference between the PHISHING and MALWARE data
sets where Google knows of at least 10 new host names for 45% and 49% of domain names, and
DMOZ, while it knows of 10 new host names for only 34% of the domain names. This indicates that
DMOZ, whose role is only to index sites people judge as worthwhile, actually is more thorough in its
coverage than the blacklists, who need to be thorough to be completely effective. This may be due
to the much quicker changes in malicious activity as compared to good sites, whose names do not
tend to change.
5.7 Discussion
It is clear from the results in this chapter that miscreants are taking advantage of wildcards. However,
we also saw more benign uses than we had expected. Among the malicious, spammers are using them
most, and are the least likely to override them. This enables them to use the wildcards effectively to
evade blacklists by switching to new host names with little effort. There is also a significant churn
among host names matching wildcards in malware and phishing domains, suggesting that they too
are likely taking advantage of the wildcards to escape exact host-name-based blacklists.
Because of the mix of good and bad uses, the fact that a wildcard is in use is unlikely to be a
good feature on its own. However, along with other characteristics, wildcard usage may be used to
flag malicious web sites proactively. Specifically, we investigated three features in Section 5.6: short
TTLs, distinct ratios of IP addresses to ASNs when the wildcard pointed to multiple IP addresses,
and the number of hosts in the domain known to Google.
Determining if a DNS response is coming from a wildcard is a low overhead operation that could
be done by software on the end user’s computer without introducing additional delay, or done by
a monitoring system just as efficiently. The monitoring system could make a query for the record
matching the wildcard record for each domain under consideration, as we do in this study. At an
end user system, this can be done in parallel with the normal DNS query for the domain, and
the results compared when both responses are received. TTL information is contained in the DNS
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response, so it also adds no additional overhead. Determining the ratio of ASes to IP addresses, or
how many hosts are known in a domain are higher overhead operations, although the former can be
done efficiently through longest prefix matching and the latter might be made efficient by a service
built to respond to such queries.
Miscreants could attempt to evade detection based on wildcards and still use a large number of
host names by creating separate DNS entries for each. However, their inherent constraint to move
across a large number of host names can be detected. The monitoring system could keep track
of how many host names within a domain it has seen resolving to the same IP address, and flag
domains passing a certain threshold of host names.
6Orphan DNS servers
6.1 Introduction
Domain Name System (DNS) records stored at the Top Level Domain (TLD) DNS servers are
commonly of two types: those that contain the host name of the domain’s name server (asso-
ciating example.com with ns1.example.com), and those that contain its IP address (associating
ns1.example.com with an address). This chapter focuses on a special case of IP addresses records
known to the TLD DNS servers: those where an IP address record exists for a DNS server whose
parent domain has ceased to exist. An example of such a case is if there were an IP address record
for ns1.example.com at the .com TLD when example.com itself was non-existent. Servers such as
ns1.example.com have come to be referred to as orphan name servers in the operational community.
Orphan name servers have been found in use by malicious web sites [82]. Orphan servers may be
attractive to miscreants for a few reasons. For example, if they are using them for purposes other
than DNS servers, having records for them on the TLD DNS server means the miscreants may not
even have to run their own DNS server. Orphans related to malicious activity may also naturally
arise from enforcement efforts by Internet Service Providers (ISPs) removing NS records of domains
found to be malicious. The DNS server may already have been in use by other domains belonging
to the same miscreant, and may continue to be used as such if the A record is left.
We focus on studying the prevalence of orphan name servers in the Internet and to understand
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what purposes, good and bad, they are used for. Within malicious uses, we consider their use by
phishing, scam, and malware web sites, as well as spammers. Significant benign uses obviously
would make it more difficult for use of orphan servers to be used as a criteria to determine malicious
intent. The questions we ask are:
• How prevalent are orphan DNS servers?
• How long do orphan name servers live?
• Are orphan name servers being used as anything other than as DNS servers?
• Are orphan name servers commonly used for malicious purposes?
We examine an average of 106 million domains (60% of the domains in the Internet at the time
of our measurements) on a daily basis for a period of 31 days to investigate aspects of orphan DNS
servers. We arrive at the following key observations:
• Prevalence: 1.7% of DNS servers we examine are orphans. Seemingly small, this amounts to
46,369 servers.
• Distribution: A surprisingly large proportion of orphans, over half, are in the .info TLD,
although it contains two orders of magnitude fewer address records than the largest TLDs.
18.8% of servers in .info are orphans as compared to just 0.4% in the much larger .com.
• Lifetime: The median lifetime of an orphan server is 8-9 days. A few last over a month. This
offers a significant window of opportunity to miscreants, especially given that finding existing
orphans is not difficult.
• Use by miscreants: Cyber-criminals have discovered that orphans can be exploited. A signifi-
cant portion of IP addresses associated with orphans, 4.4%, are known to send spam. About
1% of domain using orphans are listed on phishing and malware blacklists, although the or-
phans themselves are not often blacklisted. However, over a 26.1% of orphans serving a domain
and 43.8% of the domains using them are indirectly associated with malicious activities.
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Figure 6.1: Sample portion of a TLD zone file
6.2 Background
Here, we discuss the DNS records important to understanding orphans. We also present a scenario
which may lead to the creation of an orphan.
6.2.1 DNS Background
The DNS server at each TLD maintains a zone file containing two types of records relevant for
studying orphans. These are the NS (name server) and A (address) records for each domain falling
within that TLD. The SOA record is present in all DNS zones, but not important in the discussion
of orphans. Additional records may also be present for DNSSEC, but they are have no bearing on
the study of orphan name servers.
The NS records provide a mapping from a domain to the names of its DNS servers. Taken
together, they can also be used as a listing of all of the domains contained in the zone. Figure 6.1
shows a sample portion of a zone file for .com TLD. Here, two name servers each for domains
fake.com and example.com are listed in the NS records. However, names do not suffice. Clients
need the corresponding IP addresses to contact the name servers, but the authoritative source for
this IP address is the server itself. Accordingly, A records corresponding to the NS records are also
needed in the zone file. These records are referred to as glue records. Notice, however, that A records
for ns1.fake.us and ns2.fake.us are not listed in Figure 6.1 because they they may be obtained
from the name servers for the fake.us domain.
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Figure 6.2: Sample portion of a TLD zone file containing an orphan name server record
6.2.2 Orphan Creation
We describe how orphans are created through a scenario. A domain, orphan.com, is created,
leading to the addition of an NS record to the zone file: orphan.com NS ns1.orphan.com. The
host ns1.orphan.com is in orphan.com, so to avoid circular dependencies, its address record,
ns1.orphan.com A 1.2.4.4, is also added to the zone file. Other domains may also use this server,
resulting in the addition of NS records for them as well. If bad.com uses this server, then bad.com
NS ns1.orphan.com will be added.
Now imagine that some time later orphan.com is removed. This may occur for one of several
reasons, such as because the domain was hosting a malicious activity, or just due to the registrant
letting the domain expire. In this case, the above mentioned NS record for the domain is deleted
from the zone. However, what happens of the A record? One option is to delete it. Another option
is to let this record live on, to account for cases when other domains in .com or other TLDs depend
on it, for example, the above mentioned bad.com. Deleting the ns1.orphan.com A record would
harm bad.com, perhaps taking it completely oﬄine if this is its only DNS server. Keeping this A
record prevents the deletion of this single domain from affecting others which may rely on the same
server. This leads to the presence of orphan DNS servers. The sample zone from Figure 6.1 after
these additions and deletions is shown in Figure 6.2.
The above scenario is of course not the only way an orphan server may appear. Some may arise
out of configuration errors, such a simple typo where the name associated with an A record is not
what it should have been and so this incorrect name does not match any existing domain. Others
may occur due to lax registrar policies. While glue records are the only reason an A record should
exist in a TLD zone, mechanisms may not be in place to actually enforce this. Lack of enforcement
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of such policy would allow such records to intentionally be added directly to the TLD zones.
6.3 Methodology and Data Overview
In this section we describe our method for locating orphan name servers and finding who is using
them.
6.3.1 Finding Orphan DNS Servers
We use three different techniques for discovering orphan name servers in order to be exhaustive
where we have the necessary data, and still find some orphans where we have less data available.
These techniques are direct analysis of zone files, DNS queries based on zone file information, and
DNS queries based on malicious feeds.
Analysis of zone files
Zone files for a TLD are the ideal way to find all orphans in that TLD. We use the zones files
for 6 TLDs: .asia, .com, .info, .mobi, .net, and .org [2, 16, 68, 85, 109] from our Zone Files
data set. These TLD accounted for 60% of the 177 million domains on the Internet at the time
of our experiments [106]. We obtain these zones through file transfers from the organizations that
administer them, so they should be in a consistent state.
To find an orphan in a zone file, we use a simple algorithm. We first examine the entire list of A
records in the zone file. For each host name listed in an A record, we extract the domain name. We
then check if a NS record exists for the domain, to verify if the domain itself exists. If such a record
does not exist, then we classify the name from the A record as an orphan name server. Returning to
Figure 6.2, when we come across the A record ns1.orphan.com A 1.2.4.4, we then search the NS
records in the zone file for any NS records for the domain orphan.com. Since no such records exist,
we classify ns1.orphan.com as an orphan.
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To locate which domains are using the orphan name server, we search the zone files for NS records
that point to orphans. In this case, we would find bad.com.
DNS Queries from Zone Files
While our TLD data contains the largest TLDs, a notable deficiency is that it does not contain
any country code Country Code Top Level Domains (ccTLDs) because operators of these TLD are
not willing to share them even for research purposes. Finding orphan name servers exhaustively
for these TLD is not possible. However, we can still find potential orphans through the zone files
available to us.
Instead of looking at the A records, as we did earlier, we now look at the name servers pointed
to by the NS records. If the name pointed to is in one of the TLDs we have a zone file for, we ignore
it because if it were an orphan, it would have been identified through the previous method. If it is
not, as is ns1.fake.us in Figure 6.2, we perform two DNS queries. First, we extract the domain
name from the name server’s host name (in this case fake.us), and perform an NS query on it.
This query checks if the domain name the server is in exists. Orphans can only be present if the
domain name does not exist. If this query fails, we perform an A query on the name server’s host
name (ns1.fake.us). If this query succeeds, the host name is an orphan. Otherwise, it is just a
misconfiguration of a NS record pointing to a server that does not exist.
This method directly finds users of the orphans as well. The domain on the NS record used to
find the orphan is a user of that orphan.
DNS Queries from Malicious Feeds
To get a glimpse of the use of orphans in hosting malicious web sites, including domains not seen
by the above two methods, we bring in one more data source. We examine five different live feeds
of phishing and malware-hosting sites, APWG, PhishTank, eSoft, CleanMX, and MalwarePatrol. We
perform NS queries to identify their name servers, and then we perform DNS queries to check if these
servers are orphans exactly the way we did in Section 6.3.1.
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Start date of zone files 2009-04-01
Days of zone files used 31 Days
Domains represented in zone files 106 million
A records in zone files 2.2 million
NS records in zone files 249 million
Out of zone name servers looked up 241,179
Start date of malicious feeds 2009-04-16
Days of malicious feeds used 14 Days
Hosts in malicious feeds 242,752
Domains in malicious feeds 9,554
Name servers for domains in malicious feeds 48,042
Table 6.1: Overview of data used for orphan detection. Numbers presented are daily averages
Limitations of Data Collection
The above mechanisms allow us to find all orphan name servers contained in or used by domains in
the DNS zones we can access. It also allows us to find ones used by domains in our malicious feeds.
However, it is still not a complete picture of all orphans. To obtain a complete list is unfortunately
not practical due to data limitations. Some orphans likely exist in zones we do not have access
to. Some more may be used by domains not present in our feeds or zone files. The effect of this
limitation is that we under-estimate the prevalence of orphan name servers. Similarly, while all
of these mechanisms automatically locate users of orphans, the orphans may have more users not
contained in the zone files or malicious feeds we have access to. This leads to an underestimation in
the users of orphans as well.
6.3.2 Data Overview
We receive new zone files for each zone on a daily basis, and new malicious feeds every hour. We
repeat the process described above each day on the new data. For this analysis we use 31 days of
zone files and 14 days of the malicious feeds. Table 6.1 provides an overview of the data used to
locate orphans.
We see that as expected, there are over double the number of NS records than there are domains,
since most domains use multiple name servers. Also as expected, there are far fewer A records than
domains, since many domains share name servers. A majority of the name server IP addresses were
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contained in the zone files themselves. Only about 10% of them were out of the TLD zones and
required a DNS look-up. The malicious feeds provided fewer servers to look up than the zone files,
but are useful for providing more diversity in the potential orphan users.
6.4 Characteristics of Orphans
We now examine the prevalence, distribution, and lifetimes of the orphans we found.
6.4.1 Prevalence of Orphan DNS Servers
We begin by examining the prevalence of the orphans. As discussed in Section 6.3.1, due to data
limitations, this should be considered as a lower bound on the prevalence of orphans. Overall,
we find a total of 46,369 orphans. Each day, we record an average of 15,962 orphans. Many are
present in our data for several days. 39,443 (85%) of orphans are in the TLDs we have zone files
for, representing 1.7% of the A records in our TLDs, a small but significant percentage. For these,
we know that they are all the orphans in these TLDs.
6.4.2 Distribution of Orphan DNS Servers
We now look at the distribution of orphans in the Internet in terms of the domains, TLDs and
Autonomous Systems (ASes) they belong to, as well as their IP addresses.
Distribution in Domains and TLDs
Although we saw 46,369 orphans, they are likely not independent of each other. We can quantify
relationship among them by looking at the number of domains that contained orphans. We find
orphans in 23,153 domains, an average of 2.0 orphans per domain that has them.
Since TLD policies may affect the presence of orphan servers, we examine the number of orphans
contained in each TLD for which we have zone files. These results are seen in the top part of
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TLD # orphans A records %
.info 26,111 139,126 18.8%
.mobi 433 4,062 10.7%
.asia 99 1,313 7.5%
.org 7,715 206,513 3.7%
.com 6,428 1,566,392 0.4%
.net 530 331,896 0.2%
.us 3,931 n/a n/a
.cm 2,771 n/a n/a
.cn 2,715 n/a n/a
.br 2,495 n/a n/a
.de 2,413 n/a n/a
.ws 2,344 n/a n/a
.kr 2,118 n/a n/a
.ru 1,801 n/a n/a
.ca 1,368 n/a n/a
.in 1,340 n/a n/a
.jp 1,182 n/a n/a
Table 6.2: Orphan name servers by TLD, as compared to the total A records in each TLD zone
Table 6.2. Somewhat surprisingly, we see that .info has a much higher percentage of its A records
as orphans than any other TLD. 26,111 (18.8%) of its 139,126 A records were orphans. In fact, .info
contains four times as many orphans as the much larger .com which has an order of magnitude more
A records. Notably, the two zones run by Verisign, .com and .net, have by far the least percentage
of their A records as orphans as compared to the other TLDs. .info and .org are both operated
by Afilias. This indicates that perhaps Verisign makes policy decisions that discourage orphans.
We also checked the TLD distribution of domains containing orphans, instead of the orphans
themselves, to determine whether these high numbers were caused in part by many orphans in a few
domains. This did not change the results significantly, including no change in the ordering of which
TLDs had the most orphans.
Due to lack of zone files, we can not determine what percent of A records in other TLDs are
orphans. We can also not determine the true number of orphans in other TLDs. However, even
with the information we have, a few other TLDs stand out. Notably, 11 TLDs each have over 1,000
orphans, shown in the bottom part of Table 6.2, the most being 3,931 in .us. Since our methodology
under-counts the number of orphans in these TLDs, the actual numbers are likely to be higher. In
total, we find 123 TLDs containing orphans, although many of these contain only a few.
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IP Address Distribution
As with orphans in the same domain, orphans pointing to the same IP address are also related
since these are using the same physical machine. Collectively, we find 14,411 IP addresses in use by
orphans, an average of 3.2 orphan names pointing to the same physical machine.
To determine if certain networks are responsible for disproportionate numbers of orphans, we
translate these IP addresses into the corresponding AS numbers using the service offered by Team
Cymru [103]. We find that 14,291 of these IP addresses belong to 1,960 ASes, an average of 7.3 IP
addresses of orphans per AS that has them. This implies that about 6% of the approximately 30K
ASes that originate routes on the Internet contain orphans. The remaining 120 are IP addresses
with no corresponding AS, such as private IP addresses. These are in a sense doubly misconfigured,
since they are orphans and point to addresses which are not publicly accessible.
Most ASes containing orphans only have a few, with 89% having 10 or fewer, and 43% having just
one. In these cases, it is likely that the operators of the AS themselves are not responsible for the
presence of these orphans, at least not intentionally. Instead, these are either the result of mistakes,
or set up intentionally by some other party. However, we also see four ASes each containing over
100 IP addresses of orphans. In these few cases with many orphans pointing to the same AS, the
operators may be responsible for the behavior, but there may be another explanation. These four
top ASes belong to commercial web-hosting companies; it is possible that this behavior is instead
due to their customers creating such records pointing to the hosted address. However, if this were
the case we would expect to see the same behavior in many more ASes.
6.4.3 Lifetimes of Orphan DNS Servers
Next, we examine the lifetimes of the orphan name servers in our data. Each day we check if orphans
recorded on the previous day are still present to examine how long each orphan persists. The results
are shown in Figure 6.3.
We expected orphans to live for long periods of time, owing to the negligence in noticing them.
In reality, many are shorter-lived. Specifically, 12% of them only live for a single day. These orphans
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Figure 6.3: Orphan Lifetimes (CDF)
may have been created unintentionally and then removed once somebody noticed the error. Under
2% of them lasted for our entire 31-day data window. The median lifetime for an orphan is between
8 and 9 days, suggesting that many orphan name servers might exist for tasks that are completed
in a short amount of time, such as hosting malicious web sites which are known to live only for a
few days.
6.5 Uses of Orphans
In this section, we examine how orphan name servers are being used. We approach this question
in a few ways. First, we examine their use in the most expected way, as a DNS server. Next, we
examine the services running on each orphan. Then, we examine the domains with a large number
of orphans to learn how they are using the orphans. Finally, we look specifically for malicious uses.
6.5.1 Use as DNS Servers
We now examine how many domains are actually using orphans as their DNS servers. In total,
we see 212,850 domains using orphans as DNS servers, an average of 4.6 per orphan. Figure 6.4
shows that almost 1/3rd of the orphans are actually in use as a name server by at least one domain.
We also find a few orphans being used by a large number of domains (not shown in the Figure).
Specifically, two orphans are each used by 30K domains and two by 15K.
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Figure 6.4: Number of domains using each orphan name server (CDF)
For the rest of the orphans, 69%, we were unable to find any users at all in our data. This is
unexpected since the only purpose of A records in a TLD zone is to give addresses of name servers.
This may suggest that these orphans are simply present as a result of oversights in keeping zone
file contents up-to-date. However, perhaps they are used for other reasons. We investigate one such
possibility in Section 6.5.2. Since those serving nobody can only have been found through zone file
analysis, this also gives an idea of the percent in other TLDs we may be missing without access to
such information.
6.5.2 Running Services
Several of the host names we have collected belonging to orphan name servers begin with www.
Because www is a common label for hosts that run an http server, we check if port 80 is open on
each orphan. If so, the orphan may be used as a web server. We also check if port 25 is open to
see if they may be running an smtp server. 33% of the unique IP addresses of orphans appear to be
running an http server, based on having an open port 80, and 22% appear to be running an smtp
server, implying that they can potentially be used for sending e-mail.
From orphans with an open port 80, we select 1,000 which we do not see used as a name server.
From these orphans we request a web page. We find that 42.9% of orphans return nothing despite
having an open port. While we can not determine what content they are serving, we can not say
they are serving nothing, since they may be using cloaking, ignoring our request since it does not
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have a standard user agent. 27.9% of the orphans we checked display the Apache welcome page.
Although they may be serving content on a URL somewhere other than the root of their domain,
but there is none at the root of the domain. Although some web sites may be set up in this manner,
we have no good way of guessing which path may be used in order to check it.
We classify the type of content on those which do return real content by keyword searches on the
returned pages and manual inspection. 29.2% of orphans that had content at the root of their domain
included advertising, blogs, and scam sites including the well known “Canadian Pharmacy” [97]. The
Canadian Pharmacy scam was on 1.4% of the orphans we checked. Although these are not being
used as DNS servers, this shows that miscreants may leverage orphans for other malicious purposes.
6.5.3 Domains with the Most Orphans
Some domains contain a very high number of orphans, the ten highest all contain more than 50, and
the largest has 1,198. Although we can not determine for sure what all of them are doing, we do see
one surprising activity.
A distinct behavior is seen among seven of the top ten domains containing the most orphans.
The domain names of these tend to contain substrings like “delete” or “old”. Such domains ap-
pear to contain name server records copied from domains that have or will soon expire. For ex-
ample, we may see an orphan named ns1.example.com.deleted.info. Usually in this case, in
addition to deleted.info not existing, the other domain implied in the host name, example.com
does not exist either. However, if we send this server DNS queries related to example.com, it re-
sponds as if the domain existed, and it was a name server for the domain.Checking IP addresses,
if we ask this server for the IP address of ns1.example.com we get an address matching that of
ns1.example.com.deleted.info (itself). This server appears to be ns1.example.com simply with
its host name changed.
Based on this behavior, we conjecture that registrars move name servers from expired domains
to another domain as orphans to minimize disruption to other domains they administer. Other
domains that use a server from the expired domain for name resolution can then have their NS
record changed to point to the new orphan, perhaps automatically by the registrar, minimizing
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Data Source % of Orphan Users # Domains
Google malware 0.4% 897
Google phishing 0.0% 4
Phishing Feeds 1.1% 2,250
Malware Feeds 1.3% 2,838
Scam Feed 0.0% 22
Table 6.3: Domains using orphans appearing in sources of malicious data
disruption to the service of these domains. Since these are orphan name servers, they have the
same resolution behavior as before the original domain expired. If they were not orphans, then an
additional query would be needed to look up the authoritative name server for the domain to which
the name server was moved, creating an additional unintended dependency on the server for that
domain.
6.5.4 Malicious Uses of Orphans
Given the attractive features of orphans for malicious activity, the observation that orphans are
being used to host scam sites as we saw in Section 6.5.2, and the use of orphans by malicious sites
found in [82], the connection between orphans and malicious activities deserves investigation. We
search for malicious users of our orphan name servers in multiple sources described in Chapter 3.
These are SafeBrowsing from Google, the eSoft, CleanMX, and MalwarePatrol lists of malware
hosting sites, the APWG and PhishTank phishing lists, and the scam list from SupportIntelligence.
Table 6.3 shows how many malicious domains are using orphans as their DNS server. There
are 212,850 total domains using orphans in our data. Of these users, 2,250 (1.1%), using a total
of 86 orphan name servers, are in our phishing feeds. Similarly, 2,838 (1.3%), using a total of 53
orphan name servers are in our malware feeds. Other sources of malicious data also have orphans
associated with them, as seen in the table. A small fraction of domains containing orphans appear in
blacklists as well, the most significant being 76 appearing in the Google malware blacklist. Although
miscreants are using orphans, orphans themselves are not often blacklisted.
We additionally look for the IP addresses of orphans in the SBL and XBL from Spamhaus. We
find 4% of IP addresses of orphans appear in the SBL and 0.4% in the XBL. When we look only at
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the 500 IP addresses hosting the most orphans, the SBL results are significantly different, 13.4% are
blacklisted. We conclude that a significant fraction of orphans send spam.
Inferring Maliciousness
We find only a small number of orphans being used for malicious purposes directly. However, sources
of malicious domains are by their nature incomplete. We now infer additional orphans which are
potentially malicious.
The orphan name servers and the domains using them can be viewed as a bipartite graph. There
are two sets of nodes in the graph, one representing the orphans, and the second the domains using
them. An edge connects a node in the orphan set to a node in the domain set if and only if that
domain uses that orphan as one of its name servers. We can construct our set of orphan nodes in
two ways. We can identify them with unique host names for the orphans, or we can identify them
with unique IP addresses for the orphans. The IP address based graph tends to be smaller since
many orphans have several host names, often in different domains.
Suppose a domain node is located in a list of malicious domains. The orphan nodes that are
adjacent to it are associated with malicious activity and should be implicated, since some business
or social relationship exists between the operators of both. For the same reason, the orphans then
implicate the domains adjacent to them in the graph. By repeating this process, every node in a
connected sub-graph with a malicious domain gets implicated.
We identify each of the connected sub-graphs in the bipartite graph described above. If any
node in the sub-graph is marked malicious, then every node in the sub-graph is implicated. We
then count the number of orphans and domains implicated. We compute this based on two weeks
of data. Since orphans serving nobody can not be implicated, they are not included in our graph
construction and the implicated orphans percent is taken out of just the orphans who serve some
domain. When we group by name, we see 16% of orphans and 17.6% of domains using them related
to malicious activity. When we group by IP address, these are 26.1% and 43.8%.
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6.6 Discussion
Our study identifies three reasons why orphans exist. These are typographical errors and miscon-
figuration in TLD zone files, malicious activity, and as placeholders for deleted domains. We also
find that a significant number of the orphans are being used to send spam, and a smaller number of
orphans are used for other malicious activity including hosting scam sites and serving as the DNS
servers for phishing and malware sites. Although we only found a small amount of malicious activity
related to orphans directly, by finding relationships among orphans and known malicious domains
using them, we find evidence that a considerably greater number are involved.
Because orphans are sometimes used as placeholders for deleted domains, such domains will be
incorrectly penalized by taking the presence of orphans as a sign of maliciousness. To account for
false positives, the presence of strings such as deleted in the domain name appears to work as a
good heuristic. However, since such placeholders are possible without the use of orphans, we instead
recommend that registrars stop this practice. Additionally, a common reason for domains to be
removed is take-down due to malicious use. If this is the case, other domains using the same DNS
server may be malicious as well, justifying counting them as possibly malicious as well.
The overheads of determining if a web site is connected to an orphan DNS server are small for an
end system or a monitoring system. The monitoring system must make a DNS request to find the
DNS server for the domain in question. An end system requires this information anyway to find out
the address of the web server to be visited. As soon as the DNS server is determined, an additional
request could be made to determine if the server is in a domain that has an NS record. At an end
system, this can be done in parallel with the request for the address of the web server, so the end
user would not experience any additional delay.
7Malicious Autonomous Systems
7.1 Introduction
Much of cyberfraud thrives on armies of compromised hosts, or botnets, which are scattered through-
out the Internet. Contrary to what this may at first lead one to believe, malicious activity is not
necessarily evenly distributed across the Internet: some networks may employ lax security, resulting
in large populations of compromised machines, while others may tightly secure their network and
not have any malicious activity. Further, some networks may exist solely to engage in malicious
activity. Several recent Internet Service Provider (ISP) enforcements, such as the Atrivo and Mc-
Colo Autonomous System (AS) de-peerings [31,48] and the FTC closure of Pricewert networks [10],
highlight that there are networks that exist simply to launch attacks.
In this chapter, we examine the AS distribution of malicious activity. This examination can be
used to build metrics to identify ASes with disproportionately large amounts of malicious activity.
Such a metric could be used as a feature in our framework, to judge if a web site is on a known
malicious network.
To determine which ASes are malicious, we use ten of the most commonly-used blacklists for
spam, phishing, malware and botnet activities for a period of a month, in addition to our LocalSpam
dataset of URLs from spam collected at our department’s email server. For host name-based black-
lists, we first determine the IP addresses for each blocked host using Domain Name System (DNS)
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queries. We then use Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) routing tables to group the IP addresses
from each blacklist into their originating ASes. Upon grouping these addresses by AS, we compare
ASes by the percent of infected machines. Using data from the RouteViews Project [76], we examine
other characteristics of the malicious ASes, such as whether their connectivity to other ASes changes
more often than those without malicious activity. The key findings in this chapter are:
• A large fraction of routable space is malicious for many ASes: Four ISPs each have over 80%
of their routable IP addresses blacklisted. This raises red flags regarding the existence of such
ISPs.
• Many ASes account for significantly large fractions of blacklists: Four ASes, three of which are
US-based hosting providers, account for over 6% of at least one of the blacklists we tested.
• Many providers either harbor malicious activities or fail to consider it when peering: We find
22 provider ISPs with 100% of their customer ASes engaged in significant malicious activity.
• Malicious ASes differ from benign ones in other ways: They are more likely to become com-
pletely unreachable than those which have less malicious activity, and they are likely to have
more peers.
Overall, these results confirm that some ASes contain disproportionately large amounts of mali-
cious activity, indicating that a feature based on AS maliciousness could be useful.
7.2 Data Collection
To create a comprehensive evaluation of an AS, we use a diverse set of the data sources described
in Chapter 3. These are summarized in Table 7.1.
For each data set, the data was collected from June 1, 2009 to June 30, 2009 unless otherwise
indicated. We now discuss how each data source is specifically used in this chapter.
For phishing data, we use the APWG and PhishTank data feeds. On an hourly basis, we extract
host names from the URLs currently in the feed, and perform DNS resolutions in each host name to
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Label Duration (days) Unique IP Addresses Unique ASes
APWG 30 9,560 1,803
Bot C&C 30 1,986 611
CleanMX 30 2,974 687
eSoft 30 8,000 1,196
Local Spam 30 5,495 1,024
Malware Patrol 30 871 368
PhishTank 28 7,143 1,580
Spamhaus SBL 29 6,422 2,005
Spamhaus XBL 29 29,585,604 13,580
SI-Feed 30 7,591 1,420
SI-DNS 30 4,448 911
SURBL 30 29,324 2,739
Table 7.1: Overview of Data Sets used for finding malicious ASes
get lists of IP addresses associated with these feeds. The PhishTank data set had a two-day outage
on June 20 and June 21 causing us to only have 28 days of data for that data set.
We use the SupportIntelligence, SURBL, and LocalSpam lists of scam sites. Not every URL
in SupportIntelligence has an IP address listed, so we use the ones that are listed as one set,
SI-Feed, and perform our own resolutions as well and use them as another set, SI-DNS. We receive
SURBL and LocalSpam data once per day, and SupportIntelligence once every six hours.
As a source for spam sender IP addresses, we use the SBL from Spamhaus. We also use the XBL,
also from Spamhaus as a source of exploited machine IP addresses. The data collection for each of
these starts a day later than the others, June 2, 2009. The SBL is updated every hour, the XBL every
half-hour.
We use three feeds of web sites hosting malware, eSoft, MalwarePatrol, and CleanMX. We
perform DNS resolutions on the host names extracted from these hourly to get IP addresses.
Finally, we use one data source, ShadowServer, as a source for botnet command and control
servers. This list directly contains IP addresses, and we update it hourly.
7.2.1 Data Set Comparisons
When identifying malicious ASes for use as a feature, we would like to know if conclusions make
about the maliciousness of each AS hold in general, or are specific to certain types of malicious
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Number of Blacklists with Number of
Given IP Address IP Addresses
1 29,631,573
2 9,566
3 3,650
4 1,290
5 320
6 112
7 29
8 7
9 8
Table 7.2: Number of IP addresses appearing in multiple blacklists
activity. Due to differing goals, methodologies, and data sources, each data set we use can be
expected to contain IP addresses not seen in the others. By examining the overlap of IP addresses
from different data sets, we can see how often IP addresses are used for multiple different malicious
purposes. We first examine if individual IP addresses are involved in multiple types of malicious
activity, and then examine the same at the AS level.
In Table 7.2, we show the number of data sets containing each IP address. Intuitively, the XBL
is three orders of magnitude larger than any other data set, so the vast majority of IP addresses
appear only in a single that data set. It is further unsurprising that some IP addresses appear in
two or three data sets since some of our data sets track the same information. We see that some
IP addresses appeared in multiple data sets, with 8 IP addresses appearing in 9 of our data sets
and another 7 appearing in 8 sets. This indicates that malicious machines are occasionally used for
many forms of malicious activity, however a large majority appear not to be.
Now, we look at similarity between any two data sets. We calculate the Jaccard similarity
coefficient between the sets of IP addresses in each. Let IPSi be the set of IP addresses in data set
Si. Then the Jaccard similarity of two data sets is given by J(IPSi , IPSj ) =
|IPSi∩IPSj |
|IPSi∪IPSj |
. Results
for all data sets except for XBL are shown in Table 7.3. We ignore the XBL because its size is orders
of magnitude bigger than any other data set, hence the Jaccard coefficients involving it would be
extremely small. As expected, we see the highest similarity between the two phishing data sets, and
the two derived from SupportIntelligence data. Notably, the ShadowServer data set shares at
most 4 IP addresses with any other data set, while most others, even measuring different types of
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APWG 0 .06 .05 .02 .01 .24 .01 .04 .03 .10
Bot C&C 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
CleanMX .07 .01 .06 .07 0 .01 .01 .02
eSoft .01 .01 .05 0 .02 .01 .02
Local Spam .01 .02 .01 .06 .09 .05
Malware Patrol .01 0 .01 .01 .01
Phishtank .01 .02 .02 .05
Spamhaus SBL .01 .01 .01
SI-Feed .49 .06
SI-DNS .06
Table 7.3: Jaccard similarity between IP addresses in each data set
bad behavior, have greater similarity to each other. This exercise reinforces our belief that malicious
machines are only occasionally used in multiple fraud campaigns, at least on smaller time scales,
such as a month. Although one of the most similar, the two phishing data sets still only share 24%
of their combined IP addresses with each other. The malware data sets have even less similarity in
IP addresses. Obviously the individual malicious IP addresses are often not widely used enough or
not in use long enough to capture the attention of multiple blacklists.
We now repeat a similar calculation for the overlap between the ASes represented in each data
set. Let ASSi be the set of ASes represented in data set Si. Then the Jaccard similarity of the ASes
in the two data sets is given by J(ASSi , ASSj ) =
|ASSi∩ASSj |
|ASSi∪ASSj |
. Results for this calculation are shown
in Table 7.4. Between all pairs of data sets, there is much more similarity with regards to ASes than
there was in terms of IP addresses. While the same IP address is not often used for multiple different
malicious activities, multiple IP addresses in an AS appear to be used this way more often. The
greater overlap in ASes used for different types of malicious activity further reinforces the benefits of
searching for malicious ASes and the usefulness of this feature. Regardless of the type of malicious
activity an AS was seen engaged in, such a record could be used to help determine if other later
suspicious activities are truly malicious.
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APWG .17 .26 .34 .25 .14 .49 .26 .31 .24 .43
Bot C&C .18 .17 .15 .16 .18 .14 .16 .15 .14
CleanMX .35 .21 .25 .27 .17 .22 .22 .20
eSoft .24 .20 .33 .23 .30 .25 .30
Local Spam .17 .22 .20 .31 .33 .25
Malware Patrol .16 .12 .15 .17 .12
Phishtank .26 .29 .23 .38
Spamhaus SBL .27 .20 .29
SI-Feed .58 .33
SI-DNS .26
Table 7.4: Jaccard similarity between ASes in each data set
7.3 Degree of Autonomous System Maliciousness
Starting from the IP addresses from our data sets, we determine the originating AS for each, and
use this to group hosts at the AS granularity. In order to map IP addresses to an AS, we used a
June 15, 2009 BGP routing table from the RouteViews Project [76]. We chose this date because it
is in the middle of our data collection and is expected to give us the best estimate of the routing
information from that duration.
We loaded each advertised BGP prefix and originating AS from the RouteViews data into a trie
data structure commonly used by the routers in deciding the next interface to forward packets on
and performed longest prefix matches on each IP address to determine the AS associated with the
address. Using the AS information corresponding to each malicious IP address, we examined the
extent of AS maliciousness from two perspectives: the percentage of the AS found to be blacklisted
and the percentage of the blacklist each AS constitutes. We first describe both approaches and
their results in detail. We then examine the temporal behavior of listed machines and the peering
relationships of malicious networks.
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7.3.1 Examination of ASes by Fraction of Advertised IP Space
Given the number of malicious IP addresses associated with an AS, the most straight-forward ap-
proach to evaluating the ASes for maliciousness would be to simply order the ASes by number of
malicious IP addresses. However, such an analysis would penalize the larger AS: they simply have
more addresses so they have more hosts that could be compromised and blacklisted. Accordingly we
must consider the overall size of the AS as a factor when looking for ASes that are disproportionately
bad.
There are no direct sources that help estimate the size of an AS. Even the whois database, which
contains contact information about ASes in addition to detailed information about domain names
and IP addresses, does not contain information about which AS owns which IP prefix. However,
the prefixes advertised by an AS can be used to determine the maximum number of IP addresses
associated with the AS. While ASes often have unused IP addresses in each of our prefixes, and
it is difficult to determine just how many addresses are unused, this allows us to obtain a rough
approximate for the AS size which may be considered an upper bound. We again extracted the
prefix and originating AS information from the June 15, 2009 BGP routing table. We loaded this
information into a trie data structure as before. For each prefix associated with an originating AS,
this allowed us to determine the number of IP addresses associated with the prefix. In the process,
we were careful to exclude any sub-prefixes associated with other ASes. Such a sub-prefix may exist,
for example, if an ISP leases part of its address space to a customer with their own AS. After adding
together the address space from each of the prefixes for each AS, we had the total number of IP
addresses advertised by each AS.
With information about the number of unique machines found in the data feeds in each AS and
the rough size of each AS, we can determine the rough percentage of each AS that appears in each
data set. In Figure 7.1, we show the percentage of bad IP addresses in each AS present in our data
sets, excluding the XBL data set. We separated out the XBL due to its much larger size which made
the other results difficult to read. The AS indices on the x-axis do not match across data sets; it
would be incorrect to think that the same AS exhibits a high percentage of maliciousness of all
kinds. This figure shows several interesting results. First, a total of 31,263 ASes were advertised
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Figure 7.1: Percentage of bad IP addresses in each AS
in our BGP routing data and 46.8% of these had at least one malicious IP address in them. While
a majority of them have little to no malicious activity, a small number of ASes have as much as
0.5-10% of their IP addresses engaged in malicious activities In fact, in the SI-Feed data set, one
AS had 9.25% of its addresses in the data set. No other AS had 5% or more of its addresses in any
of these data sets.
In Figure 7.2, we show the same results for the XBL data set and the combination of each data
set. We note that the two lines are very similar and almost completely overlap because of the size
of the XBL data set. We found 58 ASes with over 100,000 compromised machines in this data set.
Additionally, 255 ASes had between 10,000 and 100,000 machines blacklisted. When looking at the
percentage of each AS’s advertised address space marked as malicious, we found that four ISPs, two
from Ukraine, one from Iran, and one from Belarus, had at least 80% of their advertised IP space
blacklisted. Another 49 in the XBL data set had 50-80% of their addresses listed. A further 556 ASes
had at least 10% but fewer than 50% of their ASes listed. These ASes may have too lax a security
policy or may be intentionally harboring cybercrime.
7.3.2 Examination of ASes by Proportion of Data Set
While examining the percentage of an AS that is blacklisted can highlight ASes with disproportion-
ately high concentrations of blacklisted hosts, it requires large data sets. While this leads to good
results based on the XBL data set, other data sets are not large enough to distinguish atypically
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Figure 7.2: Percentage of bad IP addresses in each AS in the XBL blacklist and across all blacklists
combined.
malicious networks. However, rather than consider the AS to be malicious based on the percentage
of its blacklisted address space, we can instead examine the percentage of a data set that an AS
accounts for. This can be used to highlight ASes with a large number of blacklisted hosts.
In Table 7.5, we show for each data set the number of ASes containing at least 0.25% of the IP
addresses in the data set. This marks those ASes as bad with the highest absolute number of IP
addresses flagged as malicious by each data set. However, in doing so, we wanted to avoid penalizing
large ASes that advertise large address spaces and do not necessarily account for a disproportionate
amount of maliciousness in that data set. Toward that goal, we perform the following calculations.
Let ASSi be the set of ASes represented in data set Si, and IPSi be the set of IP addresses in the
data set. For each AS aj ∈ ASSi , let IPaj be the set of IP addresses in the AS (without regards
to whether the IP addresses themselves are in the data set). Then the IP addresses we count as
malicious are those which satisfy the following two inequalities.
|IPaj ∩ IPSi |
|IPSi |
> .0025
|IPaj |∑
ak∈ASSi
|IPak |
∗ 10 <
|IPaj ∩ IPSi |
|IPSi |
The first of these inequalities simply captures those containing at least 0.25% of the IP addresses
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≥ 10%
[9%, 10%) 1
[8%, 9%) 1
[7%, 8%) 1 1
[6%, 7%) 1
[5%, 6%) 1 1
[4%, 5%) 1 1 1 2 1 1 1
[3%, 4%) 1 3 1 1 1 2
[2%, 3%) 3 2 2 2 3 2 1 1 3 1 2
[1%, 2%) 7 5 5 3 7 11 6 3 7 5 10 8
[0.50%, 1%) 16 12 10 16 6 19 16 11 16 20 19 14
[0.25%, 0.50%) 19 20 26 27 25 20 18 18 18 18 27 33 38
Table 7.5: Number of ASes in each data set containing the given percentage of all IP addresses in
the data set.
in the data set. The second ignores ASes where the proportion of the address space advertised by
all ASes belonging to the data set advertised by the AS in question is greater than a factor of ten
less than its proportion of the IP addresses. For example, if an AS contained exactly 0.25% of the
IP addresses in the data set, we would list it if it accounted for under 0.025% of the address space
of all ASes in the data set, but ignore it otherwise.
We can see that some ASes have a high concentrations of malicious activity. Focusing on the
top few rows of Table 7.5, we note that several ASes account for more than 6% of blacklisted IP
addresses in various data sets. For example, in the ShadowServer data set, we see that one AS
contains 9.11% of the IP addresses in the data set, yet its advertised address space represents only
0.002% of the address space advertised by all ASes in the data set. The next AS in this list, with
8.66% of the listed IP addresses represents only 0.006% of the advertised addresses in the listed
ASes. These two ASes are a large broadband ISP from Turkey and a hosting service provider from
the US. Incidentally, the US-based hosting provider accounts for 7-8% of all blacklisted IP addresses
also. Further, in XBL and SI-Feed data sets, we find two more US-based hosting providers that
account for over 6-8% of these blacklists.
7. Malicious Autonomous Systems 91
Overall, our results show that a small number of ASes have a disproportionate fraction of mali-
cious hosts. These ASes may harbor malicious activity and perhaps should be investigated similarly
to Atrivo or McColo [31,48]. We believe that legitimate ISPs with disproportionately high malicious
activity need to provide tighter account controls, particularly in the case of hosting providers, or
seek opportunities to provide anti-virus or firewalling services to prevent malicious activity.
7.3.3 How Long Do Hosts Stay Infected?
One can argue that ASes that clean their infected hosts are more responsible than those that do
not. Unfortunately, it is difficult to remotely confirm whether a machine has been cleaned or that
it is simply (temporarily) not being used for malicious activity. The best we can do is to determine
whether the host exhibits the same malicious behavior and is captured by our data set for long time
periods. Unfortunately, this analysis is limited by the manner in which blacklists are maintained.
In order to exclude blacklists that may not be purging clean machines quickly, we exclude the two
Spamhaus data feeds because the data sets are large and entries are only removed manually. Using
the remaining feeds, we examine how long IP addresses are listed in the data set.
In Figure 7.3, we plot the percentage of IP addresses in each data set listed for a given number
of days. Overall, we find that either IP addresses are listed in a blacklist for under five days or they
are listed for over 25 days and sometimes for the duration of our data set. This indicates that some
ISPs may either be lax about cleaning up their machines or may intentionally choose not to do so.
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Figure 7.3: Percentage of IP addresses that remain in the indicated data set for the given duration.
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In Figure 7.4, we show the number of days on which an AS had at least one host in the data set.
While the graph is similar to Figure 7.3, there are two important differences. First, we find that
smaller percentage of ASes have their IP addresses listed on 5 days or less. Also, a larger fraction
of ASes have their IP addresses listed for 25 days or more.
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Figure 7.4: Percentage of ASes that remain in the indicated data set for the given duration.
7.3.4 ASes with Unruly Children
Our data establishes that malicious activity is often disproportionately contained in certain ASes. We
now examine whether ASes with disproportionate malicious activity are closely related. We begin
by labeling as malicious any AS with at least 1% of its IP addresses appearing in any blacklist,
as described in Section 7.3.1. We then examine each of the BGP updates for June 2009 to find
provider-customer (or parent-child) relationships. Given two adjacent ASes, we infer which one is
the parent by examining the degrees of the two ASes, similar to the algorithm described by Gao [21].
We consider the AS with largest degree to be the provider.
For each provider AS, we consider the extent to which its customer ASes have been found to be
malicious. In the second column of Table 7.6, we show the number of provider ASes with at least
three children that have the indicated percentage of its children as malicious. We see 22 ASes with
100% of their customers classified as malicious. A total of 194 providers have at least 50% malicious
customer ASes.
We repeated this analysis using the definition of maliciousness from Section 7.3.2: the AS must
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Percent of Malicious Number of Provider ASes
Customer ASes Fraction of Advertised Proportion of
IP Space Data Set
100% 22
[90%, 100%) 2
[80%, 90%) 8
[70%, 80%) 17
[60%, 70%) 72 3
[50%, 60%) 73 2
[40%, 50%) 78 5
[30%, 40%) 202 24
[20%, 30%) 239 45
[10%, 20%) 204 78
Table 7.6: Percentage of malicious customer ASes for providers with more than three customers.
have at least 0.25% of the malicious IP addresses in a data set. We show these results in the third
column of Table 7.6. Five providers have at least 50% of their customer ASes labeled as malicious.
This analysis shows that there are dense clusters of malicious activity in the Internet. This
may be an indication that there are upstream providers that are willing to peer with any customer,
regardless of whether it harbors malicious activity. We hope that studies similar to ours would put
pressure on provider ASes to extensive screen their customers and require their customers to limit
malicious activity as part of their peering agreements.
7.4 Identifying Malicious Autonomous System
Having examined the degree of AS malicious behavior, we now search for other characteristics
that differ between malicious and benign ASes. Specifically, we compare ASes where we have not
observed any malicious IP addresses (good ASes), ASes where we have seen at least one malicious IP
address, ASes which have at least 1% of their IP addresses in one of our malicious data sets, and ASes
representing at least 0.25% of a blacklist as described in Sections 7.3.1 and 7.3.2. For these categories,
we compare BGP behavior, AS size, and AS connectivity. ASes can be disproportionately malicious
for several reasons, such as malicious intent by the operator of the AS, or just lax administration
practices. Therefore, we do not expect all malicious ASes to have the same properties as each other
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or for there to be no overlap with good ASes. However, we do hope to see trends in the characteristics
of the malicious ASes.
7.4.1 BGP Behavior
In order to examine BGP behavior, we begin with the earliest BGP routing table available from the
RouteViews project for June 1, 2009. We then replay in order all of the BGP updates for the month
of June, examining how routes change in the updates.
We begin by examining routing changes that result in any AS which originates a prefix becoming
completely unreachable. We consider an AS to become unreachable when all of the routes to all of
the prefixes originated by that AS have been withdrawn according to all of the routers that peer
with RouteViews. In total, 5,069 ASes become unreachable at some point in the month. This is
15.7% of the 32,193 total ASes we ever see originating a route.
In our data sets of malicious activity, we observed IP addresses from 14, 807 ASes. Of these, 2, 319
become unreachable at some point. This is the same percentage, 15.7%, that became unreachable
when examining all ASes. It appears that the chances of becoming completely disconnected or
unreachable is not affected by the degree of maliciousness contained. However, looking at just
those ASes where 1% of their IP addresses have been marked as bad, we see that 24.4% become
unreachable. ASes with the most malicious activity appear to disconnected more often than others.
Among the ASes which make up at least 0.25% of the malicious IP addresses in their data sets, only
8 (3.0%) ever become unreachable.
Many of the ASes which become unreachable do not stay that way for long. We now look at if
how long they are unreachable is dependent on the degree of maliciousness of the AS. Figure 7.5
shows the duration of time ASes in each category become unreachable, except for those making up at
least 0.25% of malicious IP addresses in a data set, which we exclude from this figure due to the low
number of data points. Some become unreachable multiple times for short durations; however, the
time plotted in this figure represents the aggregate for each AS. Timestamps on the BGP updates
are at a resolution of one second, so when an AS becomes unreachable for shorter than one second,
we count it as becoming unreachable but do not add time for this period.
7. Malicious Autonomous Systems 95
 50%
 60%
 70%
 80%
 90%
 100%
 0  5  10  15  20  25  30
Cu
m
ul
at
ive
 %
 A
Se
s
Time AS Unreachable (days)
good ASes
ASes w/malicious IPs
ASes w/>1% malicious IPs
Figure 7.5: Unreachability duration for good and bad ASes which become unreachable during our
data period.
We see a significant difference here between our categories. 96% of malicious ASes are discon-
nected for shorter than a single day, with a similar number for ASes with 1% bad IP addresses.
However, this is only 71% for the ASes not identified as malicious which become disconnected. On
the high end, while 45.7% of ASes which become unreachable have malicious behaviors, just 1% of
those unreachable for more than 2 weeks have malicious behaviors. When malicious ASes become
unreachable, they do not tend to stay that way for long. If these disconnections are intentional
de-peerings, the approach is not effective at isolating the AS for long.
The results for the length of time an AS becomes unreachable were opposite of what we initially
expected. To examine routing behavior in further detail, we now consider all connectivity changes
to ASes which originate a route (gaining or losing a peer), not just those which change its overall
reachability. Of all ASes originating a prefix, 17,286 (53.7%) have some change during our data
period. For malicious ASes, this is 8,695 (58.7%), and for those with at least 1% malicious IP
addresses, this is 2,036 (66.1%). For those making up at least .25% of one of our data sets, this is
166 (60.9%). Malicious behavior in an AS is clearly associated with routing instability; however,
this may not be a causal relationship. Both could be the consequence of poor management.
The presence of connectivity changes may be due to problems with the other peer involved in
the connection. This is less likely to be the explanation for such changes, if an AS had such changes
in its relationships with more than a single peer. Figure 7.6 shows the number of peers involved
in connectivity changes with each AS that had such changes. Among good ASes, only 36% with
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Figure 7.6: Number of peers involved in connectivity changes for each origin AS with such changes
in our data period.
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Figure 7.7: Number of connectivity changes for each origin AS with such changes in our data period.
changes had connectivity changes with multiple peers. However, among bad ASes, this is much
higher: 50% had a change in relation to more than one peer. This was similar for those with more
than 1% bad IP addresses, but was worse for those ASes making up at least 0.25% of their data set.
For these, 70% changed in relation to more than a single peer.
Similarly, Figure 7.7 shows the total number of connectivity changes. Among good ASes, 75%
of those with changes had 10 or fewer total changes, while this was only 62% for bad ASes and
45% for bad ASes representing 0.25% of their data set. Overall, among those with changes, ASes
harboring malicious behavior have a greater number of connectivity changes than good ASes, and
these changes involve more of their peers.
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Figure 7.8: Sizes of ASes containing or not containing malicious IP addresses in our blacklists.
We note that some ASes neighboring those who harbor maliciousness seem to be taking some
action against such behavior, since malicious ASes are more likely to be involved in a greater number
of routing changes than others. However, this does not seem to often result in overall losses of
connectivity for the ASes with malicious behavior. Alternatively, problems with managing the AS
may be to blame, with instability in connectivity and presence of malicious activity both being
symptoms of a larger problem.
7.4.2 AS Sizes
We now investigate whether bad ASes have differing sizes than good ones, to see if either larger
ASes or smaller ASes have a greater tendency towards malicious behaviors. For each AS, we use the
BGP routing table from June 15 to determine the size of the AS based on the size of the prefixes
they advertise. Results are plotted for our four categories in Figure 7.8.
We see significant difference between the sizes of good ASes and those containing malicious IP
addresses. While the median size for a good AS is 512 IP addresses, the median for ASes with any
malicious IP addresses at all and those with more than 1% of their IP addresses malicious is an order
of magnitude larger, and the median for those that represented more than 0.25% of a data set is
yet another order of magnitude larger. Similarly, while 67% of ASes without malicious IP addresses
have 1024 or fewer IP addresses, this is only 22% for those containing malicious IP addresses, and
1.5% for those that made up at least 0.25% of a data set.
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Figure 7.9: Degrees of ASes containing or not containing malicious IP addresses in our blacklists.
This result is to some extent expected. The more addresses in an AS, the more likely at least one
will be compromised. However, the plot for those with more than 1% of their addresses marked as
malicious closely follows the plot for those with any malicious addresses at all. This is unexpected
because larger ASes would need more total IP addresses to be malicious to end up in this category.
Overall, it appears that larger ASes are more likely to contain malicious addresses. One explanation
is that small ASes may be centrally administrated, yielding stronger security guarantees while larger
networks may have heterogeneous administration leading to more opportunities for lax security.
7.4.3 Degree of AS Peering
We now look at the degree of each AS, which is the number of other ASes with which it directly
connects. We would expect for ASes containing malicious IP addresses, especially in large propor-
tions, to have a lower degree because others would be less willing to peer with them. However, this
turns out not to be the case, as we show in Figure 7.9.
Figure 7.9 shows that the ASes with malicious IP addresses are more likely to have a higher
degree. Both have a median degree between 1 and 2 indicating that a large portion of both are stub
ASes. 99% of good ASes have a degree of 10 or below, while this is 91% for ASes with at least one
malicious host, and only 65% for ASes with at least 0.25% of the malicious IP addresses in a data
set. ASes containing malicious behavior may peer with more neighbors in case one disconnects them,
or they may have a higher degree because they are large ASes which lack centralized administration
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and lead to increased malicious behavior. In any case, the higher degrees of ASes with malicious
IP addresses may explain why they have more peering changes than good ones but tend not to lose
connectivity for long periods of time.
7.5 Discussion
In this chapter, we examined whether some networks are safe harbors for malicious activity. We
found that several ASes have high concentrations of malicious IP addresses while others represent
disproportionately higher malicious activity than their equivalently sized peers. This shows that
while botnets are commonly being used to launch attacks, malicious hosts may still be clumped
by network providers. In spite of these results, traffic cannot simply be declared malicious based
solely on its originating AS even for ASes with the high degree of maliciousness, as this would have
extensive collateral damage, penalizing legitimate traffic as well. However, if they are exhibiting the
other features of malicious activity described in this dissertation, we can be more certain the traffic
is malicious.
Determining if an AS is malicious requires extensive blacklists and knowledge of the size of an AS
which is most easily derived from BGP tables. A monitoring system could compile this information
itself and maintain a list of malicious ASes. However, this information is not commonly stored on
end hosts, and systems to easily query it are not in place. Therefore, if implemented on end hosts,
it would not be practical for them to compile this information individually. Instead, AS reputations
would have to be calculated on a periodic basis by some central entity with access to a large amount
of blacklist data, and made available for end systems to issue queries to. Once the list of malicious
ASes is generated, it is easy for a monitoring system or end hosts to determine what ASes a given
IP address is in. This simply requires a single longest prefix match operation.
8Web Redirects
8.1 Introduction
While browsing the web, users often find themselves redirected to a Uniform Resource Locator (URL)
other than the one they clicked on. Such redirects have several uses. For example, site operators
may use redirects is to track their users’ browsing patterns. Normally, a site will not be able to
tell which of the external links a user followed from their web page. However, if the link contains
a redirect which causes the user to contact the site’s web server first, the server can record user
activity and then provide the URL for the new destination. Other uses include directing users to
the correct new URLs in the case of a web site redesign, bringing users from a misspelled version
of a domain name to the correct one, and shortening long URLs so they are easier to share with
others.
From a security viewpoint, one very interesting type of redirects are the ones that are open. Links
containing redirects often use parameters to control the destination of the redirect. If the web server
does not check the parameters appropriately before taking action, one can manipulate the destina-
tion. This seemingly inconsequential aspect of open redirects has been abused in phishing attacks [20,
70]. For example, assume the following URLs is a redirect, leading the user to www.cs.indiana.edu:
http://example.com/redirect.php?dest=http://www.cs.indiana.edu/. This redirect would be
open if a phisher could replace www.cs.indiana.edu with any host name or IP they desired and
the redirect.php script on example.com would direct the browser to the new URL.
100
8. Web Redirects 101
Phishers can abuse open redirects on trusted sites to mislead users about the site they are
visiting. A casual Internet user who receives this link, perhaps in an email, may think that they
were visiting example.com when in reality they was only being redirected by example.com to the
phisher’s domain, especially if the phisher’s site had a look and feel designed to imitate that of
example.com.
In this chapter, we take two approaches to redirects. First, we examine the prevalence of open
redirects on the web. Next, we compare the use of redirects (open or not) by known phishing sites
to their use by legitimate web sites. We refer to these redirects in use by malicious web sites as
malicious redirects in this chapter. Although we do not explicitly study redirects used by scam or
malware sites, they would be useful to miscreants for drawing traffic to these sites just as they are in
phishing, and therefore useful as a feature for finding these types of malicious web sites. We arrive
at the following key results:
• Open Redirect Prevalence: We find that a significant proportion of redirects on the web are
open. 79% of redirects containing the destination in the URL were open.
• Malicious Redirects: In our preliminary study of malicious redirects, we find 75% of URLs
from a feed of phishing sites contain redirects. In contrast, only 12% of URLs from a directory
of legitimate sites contained redirects.
8.2 Background
A variety of mechanisms can be used to implement redirects. One technique, highly recommended
by the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) [115], is the HTTP redirect. It uses the HTTP protocol
to redirect users. When a user clicks on a link containing an HTTP redirect, the web server responds
with the URL for the destination of the redirect along with a status code indicating to the user that
she is being redirected.
Another approach exploits the HTML refresh to redirect users. The refresh capability exists
primarily to allow sites whose content changes frequently to specify in the HTML code of their
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pages how often the pages should be automatically reloaded. A redirect exploiting this mechanism
basically leverages the fact that it allows the destination of the reload to be specified. Since this
destination could be different from the page the user is visiting, it can be used to redirect users.
HTTP redirects may be either static or dynamic. Links containing static redirects always lead to
the same destination. Links containing dynamic redirects often embed the destination of the redirect
in a query string contained in the URL itself. When a user clicks on the link, the browser sends the
query string with the request. The web server reads the parameters contained in the query string
to decide the destination of the redirect. Dynamic redirects offer greater flexibility and convenience
for the web site operator, but can be abused if not properly secured. Due to the potential for abuse
of this dynamic capability, we focus on HTTP redirects.
A typical link containing a dynamic redirect has the following structure. In the URL, http:
//example.com/redirect.php?dest=http://1.2.3.4/, example.com is the name of the server
the client contacts and redirect.php is the script the server runs. The script takes the query
string, dest=http://1.2.3.4/, as parameters. The query string starts with a “?” character and
is frequently composed of a series of name and value pairs delimited by the “&” character. In this
example, the value, http://1.2.3.4/, is associated with the name dest.
8.3 Open Redirects
We first focus on open redirects. We begin by developing heuristics to identify open redirects. Then
we investigate the prevalence of such redirects.
8.3.1 Heuristics to Identify Open Redirects
Given a particular link, our heuristics proceed in three stages. They determine 1) if it contains a
redirect, 2) if the redirect is open, and 3) if it is not, whether it can easily be modified to be open.
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Heuristics to Find Redirects
Dynamic redirects are the only redirects which may be open. Our heuristic to find dynamic redirects
is the following: we search for the presence of a query string in the URLs. In the URLs that contain
a query string, we search for protocol prefixes http:// or https://, either in plain text or encoded,
which signal the destination of the redirect. We consider the link to contain a potential redirect if
a query string is found containing a URL pattern.
A parameter containing a URL may be present for other reasons. It does not necessarily mean
the link is a redirect. Therefore, it is necessary to validate if what our heuristic considers a poten-
tial redirect is indeed a redirect. First, we access the URL, automatically following HTTP-based
redirects, allowing us to determine the URL of the page at the end of the redirection chain. If the
URL of the final page is different from the original URL requested, we classify the page as using a
redirect. The rest are not redirects.
We also note that a redirect does not necessarily mean that the destination of the redirect
matches the destination contained in the query string of the URL. One such case where this may
happen is when multiple cascaded redirects occur. Since we are interested in determining whether
it is possible to manipulate the destination of the redirect for attacks, we focus only on the redirects
where the final destination matches the destination contained in the query string of the original
URL. Subsequently, we refer to such redirects as simple redirects. To find these redirects, we first
extract the destination of the redirect from the URL’s query string. The destination begins with
an http:// or https:// and either ends with a “&” character, which marks the beginning of the
next key-value pair, or when the URL itself ends. Upon traversing the URL, if the final destination
URL matches that contained in the redirect, we test it for openness. For example, if the redirect
http://example.com/redirect.php?dest=http://1.2.3.4/ resulted in the final destination URL
of \url{http://1.2.3.4/}, we scrutinize it further; otherwise, we exclude it from further analysis.
Heuristic to Find Open Redirects
A redirect is open if the destination contained in its query string can be altered and the web server
processing the redirect sends the client to the new location without validation. To test if a simple
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redirect is open, we replace the destination URL contained in the query string of the redirect with a
web site that we control. On that site, we include a randomly generated 200 character string that is
unlikely to appear on other web pages. We then follow the link to determine whether it causes the
browser to return a page containing the string. If so, we consider the page to be an open redirect.
Heuristics to Pry Redirects Open
If a redirect employs weak protections, it may be possible to pry it open. For example, some redirects
may employ a checksum for the destination contained in the query string, preventing the redirect
from being used if the checksum is incorrect. By altering the checksum along with the destination,
one may be able to pry open such redirects. Though exploiting such redirects would require some
thought on the part of the attacker, they can be easily exploited by others once an algorithm to
open them is developed. We now explain the heuristics we use to test if a redirect which was not
open according to the previous heuristic can be pried open.
Redirects which have query strings with only one parameter, the URL of the destination, clearly
do not have other query string parameters securing the redirect. If they are not open, they must be
using some internal mechanism, such as a white list, to secure the redirect. Such redirects cannot be
pried open externally. For such cases, we focus on detecting whether such redirects use white lists
containing popular web sites.
Redirects whose query strings have at least one parameter other than the destination required
some thought. If altering the destination and leaving the remaining parameters unchanged failed to
open the redirect, the redirect is secured internally or there is at least one parameter the server is
testing before redirecting. Even though 90% of the redirects had 4 or few parameters including the
destination parameter, varying each to infer which of the parameters could be altered would have
been cumbersome.
Upon manual inspection, we found that some of the parameters are unlikely to be specific to the
destination of the redirect. For example, two of the common parameters were related to language
of the page and country of origin of the request. However, many sites will have the same language
and country or origin.
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Instead of trying to infer the intent of all parameters to check which ones were specific to the
destination, we tried two very simple strategies: we either dropped all the parameters other than
the URL, or altered each of them simultaneously in trivial ways. Specifically, if a parameter was a
number, we simply incremented it, and if it was a string, we dropped a character from the string.
Doing so essentially only checked if the server was checking anything at all for the altered destination.
While one may expect that anything outside of the permitted destinations would be denied if the
default case was handled properly, we found quite the contrary: many servers were only allowing
the permitted destination with a given set of parameters, but allowed arbitrary destinations when
these parameters were altered. We describe these and other results in Section 8.3.3.
8.3.2 Data Collection
To find the prevalence of exploitable redirects in the web, we performed extensive web crawls using
three different data sets, described in more detail in Chapter 3. For each data set, we obtained a
URL for a top page, downloaded that page and any page linked from that page that was within the
same DNS domain as the original page. We examined all the links contained in the top-level pages
as well as on the pages we followed using the heuristics described in Section 8.3.1.
In our first data set we extracted the 1, 000 most popular sites in each of 16 top level categories
from Alexa, and the top 500 overall. Some sites were present in multiple categories; upon removing
duplicates, we found 15, 341 unique web sites. We used each of the sites obtained from Alexa as
starting pages for web crawling. This crawl resulted in 864, 628 web pages.
The second data set uses links from DMOZ. To obtain a similar number of sites as in the first
data set, we randomly selected 16, 500 unique links in the DMOZ directory on October 23, 2007. We
obtained 216, 812 web pages from this crawl.
For our third data set we used our LocalDNS data in order to focus on actual user behavior. In
a one week snapshot, this data contained 164, 145 unique host names. From this crawl, we obtained
1, 368, 198 web pages.
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Source Total No Query No URL Potential
Data Set Pages Links String Pattern Redirects
Alexa 864,628 53,833,400 71.00% 27.92% 1.07%
DMOZ 216,812 5,745,145 70.09% 28.99% 0.92%
LocalDNS 1,368,198 81,186,127 73.07% 25.24% 1.70%
Table 8.1: Classification of links extracted from each data set
Potential Redirects Actual Not Redirects Broken
Alexa 283,001 68.75% 23.01% 8.24%
DMOZ 20,364 58.61% 19.28% 22.10%
LocalDNS 562,118 68.48% 18.17% 13.35%
Table 8.2: Classification of potential redirects from each data set
8.3.3 Prevalence of Open Redirects
Recall from Section 8.3.1 that potential redirects specify a destination in the URL’s query string
(identified by the presence of http:// or https://). When eliminating URLs that fail these tests,
between 0.92% and 1.7% of the links remained in our data sets, as shown in Table 8.1. We note that
even links that are not regarded as potential redirects could be involved in redirects; these pages
may use a mechanism to obfuscate their functionality. Short of traversing each of them individually,
there is no way to find such redirects. Since visiting over 140 million links from our three data sets
would have been very time consuming, we simply excluded these cases which did not have a query
string or a destination specified. Accordingly, the results we present serve as a lower bound on the
actual number of redirects on the web.
After removing duplicates there were 815, 779 unique potential redirect URLs. These spanned
4, 978 unique domains, and 82 unique Top Level Domains (TLDs). Validation of these redirects
through an actual traversal, as described in Section 8.3.1, confirmed that 557, 646 (68%) were actual
redirects. A further 100, 191 (12%) of the links were broken and could not be retrieved. The rest
did not appear to use redirection even though they contained a query string with a URL pattern.
Table 8.2 shows the breakdown of these categories by data set. We see that a significantly lower
portion of potential redirects are actual redirects in the DMOZ data set, which is composed of random
sites, than in the other data sets.
Recall from Section 8.3.1 that simple redirects are easily manipulated by attackers. These are
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Simple Redirects Open Closed Broken
Alexa 65,012 83.00% 12.97% 4.03%
DMOZ 3,117 81.30% 13.86% 4.84%
LocalDNS 98,138 77.65% 19.65% 2.70%
Table 8.3: Classification of simple redirects from each data set
redirects where the destination of the redirect is the same as the URL included in the parameters
of the query string. Of the actual redirects, 177, 284 (32%) passed this test. Based on a manual
inspection, those that did not fell into several categories: redirection to site authentication pages,
transitions of the protocol from HTTP to HTTPS, search pages, and blog posting pages. While
these links do have query strings that contain URL patterns and use redirection, these factors
are independent, suggesting these redirects were statically configured even though they looked like
dynamic redirects. Since these cannot be manipulated, we exclude these links from testing for open
redirects.
Next, we tested if the 177, 284 simple redirects were open, as described in Section 8.3.1. Replacing
the destination of the redirect with our custom page was not possible for 16, 142 of the URLs because
they used non-standard character encoding; we excluded these redirects from subsequent analysis.
Of the remaining 161, 142 entries, 128, 058 (79%) of the redirects were completely open: traversing
them caused the server to redirect to our custom page instead of the original one contained in the
destination of the redirect. Another 5, 108 (3%) returned an error. From this, it is clear that sites
that use parameters to determine the destination of the redirect fail to secure their redirects a vast
majority of the time. These results are shown by individual data sets in Table 8.3. Results across the
data sets were similar, with popular Alexa sites containing the highest percentage of open redirects.
The LocalDNS data set had the lowest percentage of open redirects.
We then tested if the remaining simple redirects, 27, 976 (17%), could be pried open. As de-
scribed in Section 8.3.1, we used three approaches to subvert these protections: alter all parameters
simultaneously except the URL (which reflects the new destination), drop all the parameters except
the URL, and replace the redirect URL with a popular site possibly on the server’s white list (we
used google.com). To our surprise, 2, 346 (8.4%) could be pried open by at least one of these ap-
proaches. Dropping the non-URL parameters was the only effective approach in 965 cases. Altering
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the non-URL parameters was the only effective approach in 682. In 699 cases, either dropping or
altering the non-URL parameters successfully resulted in prying open the redirect. There were no
cases where simply changing the URL to a popular site opened the redirect. In total, simple redi-
rects were either open or pried open in 81% of the cases we examined, yielding 130, 404 unique open
redirect URLs.
8.4 Malicious Redirects
While open redirects may be attractive to miscreants, we do not know how often they actually take
advantage of them. Here, we present a preliminary look at the actual use of redirects by miscreants.
8.4.1 Data Collection
We use two sources of data for this investigation. For malicious URLs we use a snapshot of the APWG
feed on June 15, 2010. This feed contains links to phishing sites. Trying to convince a user to click on
a link leading to a phishing site is one place miscreants are likely to use misleading redirects. At the
time we use it, this snapshot is under two hours old. For benign URLs we once again use the DMOZ
data set, this time using a snapshot from May 26, 2010. Although this snapshot is older than the
APWG snapshot we used, this should not cause problems as benign sites are relatively stable. Unlike
when we looked for open redirects, here we directly use the URLs in the DMOZ data set, instead of
crawling based on them. This is so our methodology for good sites is as similar as possible to our
methodology for malicious. We use the entire snapshot of the APWG feed. However, since the DMOZ
feed is so much larger, we sample it randomly at a rate of 0.1%.
Similar to our search for open redirects, here we continue to focus on HTTP redirects. For each
URLs in the sample, we perform an HTTP HEAD request. This request is similar to the GET
request used to retrieve a web page, however it does not return the page contents. The header,
including the return code that tells us if we are being redirected, remains the same. We set our user
agent string to match that of Firefox 3.0, in case some sites discriminated based on browser version.
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Total Without Percent
URLs Errors Redirects
APWG 2401 1567 75.1%
DMOZ 4042 3922 12.1%
Table 8.4: Redirects found in benign and malicious URLs
8.4.2 Results
In total, we tested 2401 URLs from the APWG list and 4042 from DMOZ. Not all of these are valid. Some
return server errors or error messages indicating the page no longer exists. This is especially likely to
happen for malicious pages, as they may be taken down soon after discovery. Upon removing these,
1567 from APWG and 3922 from DMOZ remain. The results we present in Table 8.4 are in relation to
these numbers.
Both malicious and benign URLs have a significant number of redirects. However, there is a
large difference with over three quarters of APWG URLs using redirects, compared to a much smaller
percent of DMOZ. When we see redirects, there are further differences. Among the DMOZ redirects,
52.2% used HTTP status code 301, meant to be used when a page has been removed permanently.
In contrast, very few of the malicious pages used this code. Instead, 97% of them returned HTTP
status 302, meant to be used when a page has been moved temporarily. A more detailed study of
the characteristics of benign and malicious redirects is needed.
8.5 Discussion
Our analysis found that a large proportion of redirects on the web are open and can be manipulated
and exploited. Although we do not know at this point if miscreants are taking advantage of open
redirects, we know they are using redirects heavily. Although more work is needed, it appears that
the mere presence of redirects can be a useful feature to identify malicious activity, especially in
conjunction with other features discussed in previous chapters.
Ideally, the open redirect problem would be solved by careful design and configuration of software
on the server side. Administrators could configure whitelists of approved destinations to ensure
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their redirects are not misused. However, this approach requires the site to store a database of valid
third-party redirect destinations, which may be extensive in some cases, and requires administrative
overhead to keep the list current. Even if most server administrators closed their redirects, all it
takes is a few open ones for miscreants to take advantage of. Therefore, client-side solutions are
necessary.
At the end system, client web browsers can apply the heuristics we used to identify HTTP
redirects in general or open redirects. To identify HTTP redirects there browser simply needs to
check the status code returned from a HTTP request. This adds no overhead, since it must do this
anyway to follow redirects. To identify open redirects, the browser would examine the link for any
URL patterns in the query string. If a destination is specified, the browser would replace the URL
pattern with a test verification web page. If upon following that link, the client is redirected to the
verification page, it has confirmed that the redirect is open. This can be done in parallel to loading
the users intended destination. A monitoring system could perform these tests as well. It would
need to request each URL, but this feature should not have the overhead of a web crawler since page
content is unnecessary, so HTTP HEAD requests could be used.
9Related Work
Much previous work has been put into the identification of malicious activities on the Internet.
We first discuss work related to each of the five infrastructure features we examine. Then, we discuss
other work that examines characteristics of malicious infrastructure, some of which could be adapted
to work in our framework. Finally, we briefly discuss other approaches to the scam, phishing, and
malware problems.
9.1 Our Features
9.1.1 Fast Flux
The Honeynet Project and Research Alliance was the first to recognize the prevalence of fast flux
in hosting malicious sites. Although their white paper [104] does not provide a model which can be
used to identify fast flux, it provides several pieces of valuable information including two real world
examples of Domain Name System (DNS) resolutions for fast flux host names, and a case study
of the activities of an infected system. In a more recent study of similar nature, Konte et al. [47]
examined the role of fast flux in hosting 21 online scams observed at a single spam trap.
Many fast flux campaigns are hosted on botnets. Nazario et al. [71] investigated the behaviors of
botnets behind fast flux. They find 80% of fast flux domains are registered at least a month before
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actual use. They also find a long lifetime for fast flux domains, a median of 18.5 days after the
domain has become actively used.
The general topic of fast flux detection has also received attention from several researchers. Holz
et al. [30] examine flux in scam sites. They produce a model to identify flux based on the number of
DNS address records, Autonomous Systems (ASes), and DNS name server records for a host. They
find about 30% of domains they collected from spam mails are using fast-flux. They always use
information from two DNS resolutions, so their method of detection is not light-weight enough for
use in our framework. In another similar study, Passerini et al. [80] also examine fast flux in scam
sites. They crate a model to classify sites as fluxing or not based on nine parameters. Some of these
are DNS measurements, some are similar to those we use, and several others are based on whois [13]
records, including the age of the domain and its registrar. They do not investigate which of these
features is actually effective. While we could use whois-based features for either flux detection or as
features on their own, We choose to avoid these due to concerns surrounding the accuracy of whois
information [34].
Caglayan et al. [8] developed a Fast Flux Monitor to detect fast flux in real time. Their system
uses the Time to Live (TTL) on DNS records, along with scores quantifying the change in A records
in a 10 minute interval, and the dispersion of the IP addresses. Although they have implemented
a prototype of their system, they do not give a detailed evaluation of its effectiveness or what
parameters are most useful in detection.
A different approach to combating flux is taken by Bambenek [7]. Instead of detecting it, he
proposes making modifications to the DNS system to make it more difficult. Specifically, he proposes
that the domain registrars limit changes to authoritative DNS servers to once every 72 hours. He
also recommends that DNS servers not allow TTLs shorter than 24 hours for NS records. Further, he
recommends that DNS clients not accept records with TTLs shorterthan 12 hours. Unfortunately,
this proposal would be difficult to implement. It would require changes to DNS client software on
every computer. The changes to servers would likely be ineffective due to miscreants running their
own DNS servers without the changes. Additionally, these changes may have harmful effects on
legitimate records, such as those resulting from Content Distribution Networks (CDNs), which also
rely on low TTLs.
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9.1.2 DNS Wildcards
Wildcard records have been a part of DNS from the original specification [63]. The description of
wildcard behavior in this specification is ambiguous and unintuitive, so RFC 4592 [50] was created
to clarify the intended behaviors of wildcard records.
In addition to issues arising from the specification being non-intuitive, it has been argued that
they violate common assumptions on how DNS should operate. An Internet Architecture Board
(IAB) commentary [33] describes the way wildcards violate these assumptions and the issues that
can arise from it. It recommends only using wildcards with MX DNS records, since they are the only
ones that only affect a single protocol. It also recommends not ever using wildcards for domains
that have subdomains. Nonetheless, wildcards are in widespread use.
Other work points to evidence of wildcards being used for somewhat malicious behaviors. Two
advisories by Netcraft [62,69] detail specific ways wildcards are used by phishers. They find wildcards
in use for two purposes, first, to make the host name appear legitimate, and second, to randomize
the host name to avoid blocking mechanisms. Zdrnja et al. [118] examine DNS responses collected at
a university Internet gateway. They find many typo-squatted domains using wildcards. While they
claim the risk from such domains is high, they do not specifically find them involved in malicious
activities.
9.1.3 Orphan DNS Servers
To our knowledge, there has been only a single other work that has looked into the problem of
orphan name servers. This resulted in a recent presentation at an ICANN meeting [82], and was
based on data collected by Karmasphere [44] and Internet Identity [36]. Their work begins with
lists of malicious domains and checks if any name servers used by them are orphans. They find
3.4% of phishing domains and 59% of fast flux domains use orphans. However, because they start
with malicious domains, they do not identify orphans used for benign purposes. We take a different
approach, starting with Top Level Domain (TLD) zone files instead of just with malicious domains,
in order to find the general prevalence of orphans.
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9.1.4 Malicious Autonomous Systems
Our work on identifying malicious ASes is motivated by recent disconnections of malicious ASes
from the Internet due to malicious activities. These include Atrivo [31] and the web hosting provider
McColo [32], both shut down in 2008 by their upstream providers, as well as Pricewert [10], shut
down in 2009 by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). In all three cases, the networks were accused
of large amounts of botnet activity, malware hosting, and spamming. While these three attracted
enough attention for high profile action against them and coverage by much of the technology news
media, we aim to determine to what extent malicious activity is clustered together in other ASes
which have not received as much attention or drastic action.
Other work touches on AS locations of malicious behaviors on the Internet. In a paper on
spammers’ behaviors, Ramachandran et al. [87] find that a small number of ASes are responsible
for sending a large amount of spam, with 36% of all spam coming from just 20 ASes out of the
approximately 30,000 total ASes on the Internet today. Konte et al. [47] examined scam hosting
infrastructure. Among their findings was that for the spam campaigns they examined there was
almost no overlap in the ASes of the spamming machines and the ASes where the scam web sites
were hosted. These papers do not focus on the AS locations of the behavior in detail as we do.
One other paper, by Stone-Gross et al. [100] does. They used a different method of measuring AS
maliciousness than either of ours, and did not examine BGP behaviors or relationships among the
ASes identified.
Some works attempt to locate malicious behavior at granularities other than ASes. In their study
of spyware, Moshchuk et al. [65] find that certain categories of web sites, such as those offering free
downloadable games, contain more spyware than others. Similarly, work by Provos et al. [84] finds
that 67% of malware download sites in drive-by downloads are hosted in a single country; China.
While there is insight to be gained by examination at these other granularities, locating malicious
behavior by web site category or by country likely does not narrow the location down small enough
to be useful for identification.
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9.1.5 Web Redirects
Client-side defenses are necessary in cases when legitimate web sites fail to protect their redirects from
manipulation of the redirect destination. Today, phishing toolbars can detect the final destination
of the redirection chain and block access to known phishing sites [72]. However, the phishing site
must be blacklisted before such toolbars can operate, which does not immediately protect users from
deception. Likewise, a blacklist of open redirect web pages would have similar limitations. Redirect
Remover [116], a Firefox browser extension, analyzes links on the page client is visiting and rewrites
them to expose the actual destination. Unfortunately, this breaks some of the legitimates uses of
redirects. Further, it does not protect against phishing, where the redirected links come from email
messages.
Fette et al. [20] describe open redirects in email as an indication of phishing. They use this to
motivate one of their heuristics for detecting phishing emails based on the number of dots contained
in Uniform Resource Locators (URLs) in the email. Wang et al. [110] analyze web sites to detect
malicious sites that exploit browser vulnerabilities. In doing so, they analyze whether web site
redirects are being used to obfuscate the attack. They find that many sites hosting exploits hide
behind redirects. When following redirects, their list of exploit providers grew 263% larger than the
exploit providers they found scanning URLs without following redirects.
Netcraft provides a commercial service to check web sites for open redirects [72]. They addition-
ally provide examples of previously found open redirects. However, they do not provide details of
their methods or any information on what they find beyond the small set of motivating examples.
9.2 Malicious Infrastructure
Various characteristics of malicious web sites have been investigated in previous work. Some of these
could likely be incorporated as features to detect malicious activity based on infrastructure.
Ramachandran and Feamster [87] examine the network level behaviors of spammers. They find
that a few portions of IP address space send most spam, most hosts that send spam only send a
few messages each, and spammers are taking advantage of short-lived route announcements. In this
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last practice, spammers announce IP address space using Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), send
the spam, and then withdraw the announcement. This practice can make the origin of the spam
message untraceable. These short-lived announcements often involve address space not belonging to
the spammer announcing it. This case is called BGP prefix hijacking, and it likely has no legitimate
use. Several papers, including work by Zhang et al. [122] and many others, seek to identify hijacking
attempts. Zhang et al. also have work on defending against hijacking attempts [121]. Several other
systems, such as SBGP [45] and soBGP [112], also prevent prefix hijacking. Although we did not
investigate it, prefix hijacking could indicate malicious behavior (although it could also happen due
to configuration error), and may be a good infrastructure feature to use for our purposes.
Anderson et al. [4] attempt to characterize scam hosting infrastructure on the Internet. They
apply an image shingling technique which allows them to determine the graphical similarity of web
pages. They use this technique to find that 36,390 unique URLs in their spam feed lead to just 2,334
distinct scams. They also find that most scams from their trace are hosted on a single IP address
and one domain name. Unfortunately, while their goal was to look for infrastructure characteristics,
nothing they find can be easily used as a feature in our framework aside from the observation that
most spam relays and scam hosts fall into two address ranges. However, the ranges are large and
they do not discuss if those ranges are more populated in general than most. Other work, such as
that by Lui et al. [111], and Medvet et al. [59] also propose schemes that use visual similarity. Both
look for similarity of elements on the page, such as similar text colors, fonts, and alignment, and
similar image sizes and color. They also look for overall page similarity. Although these approaches
are more content-based than the ones we examine, they are also taking advantage of a behavior very
beneficial to the miscreant: imitating a legitimate page. Because of the low sample sizes used in
these papers for evaluation, the true effectiveness of these approaches can not be determined. If the
comparison could be done quickly enough, this feature may be a useful addition for our framework.
McGrath and Gupta [57] examine URLs used in phishing attacks and the attack lifetimes. They
find that 50-75% of phishing URLs contain brand names, that phishing domain names are shorter
than good domains names, and that phishing URLs are generally longer than good URLs. They also
find that letter frequencies in phishing URLs differ significantly from letter frequencies in English,
while those in a corpus of good URLs are similar to that of English. These simple characteristics
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would be easy to test for. Garera et al. [22] also examine phishing URLs. They find that the name
of the organization being phished is often contained in the URL, but not often in the host name.
When the name is contained in the host name, the host name is very long. They also look for the
URLs in Google’s database, based on the assumption that newer URLs will not be indexed, and
phishing URLs will have a low Page Rank [79]. Whittaker et al. [113] examine some of these same
features, plus others such as common strings contained in URLs aside from just the bank name and
common terms appearing on the web page. They claim a false positive rate of below 0.1%, however,
their system relies on a whitelist for a large portion of its classifications, and is only trained and
evaluated against biased data, mainly URLs from emails marked by users as spam.
Zhang et al. [120] present a system called Cantina, which uses content to detect phishing web
sites. While they are primarily detecting based on content, and not on Infrastructure, some of the
features they look at are appropriate for our framework. One of these is the age of the domain. They
find that phishing web sites are often registered only a few days before phishing emails are sent.
They also check for the number of dots in a URL, similar to the length heuristic discussed above,
for suspicious characters such as an @ in the URL, and for an IP address instead of a domain name.
Another feature they look for is forms asking for personal information. These can all be considered
infrastructure features which should be simple to check, and so can be used in our framework. Fette
et al. [20] use a similar set of features as Cantina to detect phishing emails, including the age of
domain names linked to, IP address based URLs, and links with a URL in the text not matching
the actual destination of the link.
Other recent work takes a proactive approach to finding the domain names likely to be used by
malicious web sites. Felegyhazi et al. [19] searches for domain names registered at the same time
as malicious ones. They then check if these domains use the same DNS servers and change DNS
servers at the same time as known malicious ones. If so, they infer that these are likely to belong
to the same people and are therefore likely also malicious. While this is an interesting method of
finding malicious domain names based on infrastructure, those it finds will be as old as some already
blacklisted. While better than current blacklisting, it could still be identifying these domains too
late. Sato et al. [91] use DNS in a different way to find domains to add to blacklists. They examine
DNS queries, and consider a domain name to be likely malicious if it is queried by many of the
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same hosts as a known malicious domain. Work by Prakash et al. [83] uses a different method
of generating suspected new malicious URLs. They use heuristics based on similarities of existing
blacklisted URLs to generate others. As with the previous system, it is likely that the URLs found
this way may already be in use, but not yet blacklisted. In fact, they find that many of the generated
URLs are in use with similar content.
Work on understanding botnets is important to us as it is believed that scams are often hosted on
bots. Gu et al. [27] present BotSniffer, a system for detecting botnets by detecting their command
and control traffic. Detecting which hosts are bots would be a great addition to our framework.
Unfortunately, BotSniffer relies on monitoring network traffic at the edge of the network containing
the bots in order to find the bots. In other work, Gu et al. [26] present BotHunter, which detects
bots a different way. They monitor traffic for the stages of a botnet infection, looking for inbound
scans followed by a download and outbound attacks. As with BotSniffer, this system detects bots
only in the network it is deployed on. This requirement makes both systems impractical to use in our
framework. BotMiner, by Gu et al. [25] detects bots a different way by looking at communications
patterns and malicious activity patterns. It then clusters separately based on these two types of
patterns and declares hosts in the same cluster by both methods to be part of the same botnet.
This system has the same drawback as the previous two. Rajab et al. [86] use DNS cache snooping
to find botnets, in addition to monitoring command and control. Unfortunately, the DNS cache
snooping can only indicate which networks have botnets, not the actual machine. Additionally it
only works if the DNS server used on the network for internal queries answers external ones as
well. Unfortunately, we know of no infrastructure measurement that can directly tell us which IP
addresses are hosting bots without monitoring their traffic.
9.3 Other Approaches
Other approaches to scam, phishing, and malware are complementary to our framework. Scams can
be mitigated by detection of spam emails. Additionally, other methods of characterizing malicious
URLs are possible. We discuss some of these complementary approaches here.
Spam is a key method used by miscreants to draw visitors to their sites. Various approaches have
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been taken to identify unauthorized mail senders in order to prevent spam. Three of these which op-
erate through DNS are Sender Policy Framework (SPF) [114], DomainKeys [14], and SenderID [51].
All of these basically publish records in DNS that allows a recipient to check if the sender was
authorized to send mail for the domain the mail appears to be coming from. These methods rely on
the recipient and the sender’s claimed domain both participating in the scheme, while we try to rely
on features that do not require participation from any outside entities. They also try to prevent the
spam mail itself, while we are more focused on the web.
Ramachandran et al. [88] present a system called Spamtracker, which identifies spam based on
sender behavior rather than the sender’s IP address. They cluster spammer IP addresses based on
the set of domains spam mails were sent to from those IP addresses. They then determine if a mail is
spam by checking if the sender has sent mail to a set of domains similar to one of the clusters. This
approach requires access to the email logs of a large number of domains, so it may not be practical
for many organizations. It also relies on the assumption that spammers are consistent with the set
of domains they target.
Xie et al. [117] present a system called AutoRE, which clusters spam in a different way. They
look at the URLs contained in the spam messages, and cluster together messages that are similar.
Further, they identify botnets sending spam by looking for the same URL signature in messages sent
simultaneously from at least 20 ASes. They are able to identify 7,721 spam campaigns and 340,050
botnet IP addresses in this manner. However this system requires a large amount of email to work
on.
Hao et al. [28] design a system called SNARE, with the goal of detecting spam based on network
level features. They use several features to detect spam, some of which only require a single packet.
Some of these are related to the features we use for detecting malicious web sites, such as how far
geographically spam travels from the sending machine to the target, and what AS they are contained
in. They claim a 70% detection rate of spam emails, with only a 0.3% false positive rate. However,
they focus on spam, while we focus on the scam web sites it may lead to. Additionally, some of their
features require aggregate data, such as mean and variance of message sizes from a given sender.
Email is not the only delivery mechanism for spam. Niu et al. [75] examine forum spam. They
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find forum spamming to be widespread, with spam often posted on older pages for the purpose of
manipulating search engines. They also find a large percentage of blogs on three blog hosting sites
to exist for the sole purpose of spam.
Ma et al. [52,53] present a system with similar goals to ours, proactive identification of malicious
URLs, but a different method of reaching that goal. We aim to identify malicious web sites based on
techniques beneficial to the miscreants. As such, our features should each apply to many malicious
web sites. Because of this, we believe our framework is viable with only a small number of features,
and the feature set should be relatively stable. The approach taken by Ma et al.instead relies on
an extremely large number of features, mostly based on the URL itself. The biggest difference
in their approach is the specificity of the features they use. For example, each individual domain
name seen is a feature in their system, as is each IP prefix, each AS number, and each TLD. This
leads to an extremely large number of feature, over half a million after running their system for ten
days. Because of this, the model they use to classify new URLs needs to be updated frequently.
In contrast, our set of features is stable, only changing when miscreants adopt new fundamentally
different provisioning strategies. We believe our approach is also more robust to non-fundamental
changes in operations. Their system may have difficulty if a group of miscreants were to change
many minor characteristics such as their path structure, the hosts they are using, and their host
names all at once. However, ours is likely to be more robust to these small changes, as long as the
fundamentals activities continue such as use of fast flux to avoid take-down and use of many host
names through DNS wildcards for ease in evading blacklists.
A large amount of work examines integrating anti-phishing tools into the web browser. Many
of these simply rely on blacklists. Kirda and Krugel [46] take a different approach. Instead of
identifying malicious domains, their plug-in, Anti-Phish, stores information entered in forms and
alerts the user to a phishing attempt if the same information is entered in a form on a different
site. Such an approach is likely to have high false positives in practice. Many browser toolbars to
detect phishing exist, along with blacklist based solutions built in to Microsoft Internet Explorer [60]
and Mozilla Firefox [66]. Ten of these are compared by Zhang et al [119]. They find that only two
correctly identified more than 60% of phishing URLs, and one of these also flagged 42% of legitimate
URLs as phishing. Chou et al. [11] created a browser plug-in called Spoofguard, notable because it
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does not use blacklists or whitelists. Instead it determines if a page is a web spoofing page based on
characteristics of the domain name, URL, and images. Spoofguard identified the most phishing pages
in Zhang’s work, but also had the highest false positives. McAfee site advisor [56] goes beyond trying
to identify phishing as most of these tools do, and also examines sites for downloads of spyware,
adware, other malware, and for if the sites it links to are considered good.
Moshchuk et al. [65] examine the prevalence of spyware on the web. They perform two web
crawls. In the first, they crawled 18 million URLs and found that 13% of the 21,200 executables
they found contained spyware. They also found drive-by downloads on almost 6% of pages they
crawled. In their second crawl, they found a reduction in infected files and in drive by downloads,
although they found more unique spyware programs. Although the reduction in infected files was
substantial, down to 5.5%, they attribute the reduction to a single site being cleaned. They also
examine which of the sites serving spyware are blacklisted, and find that blacklists concentrate on
sites serving certain kinds of malware, and focus on the heavy hitters.
Network based intrusion detection systems (IDSes) use signatures capturing a wide variety of
malicious behaviors. However, their goal is to identify malicious traffic instead of malicious sites,
so they look at traffic properties for their characteristics. Snort [90, 95] signatures consist of values
to look for in packet headers, as well as fixed strings to match in the packet payload. It allows
plug-ins to extend its functionality. Bro [49, 81] uses regular expressions in its signatures, has its
own language for specifying the signatures easily, and can incorporate analysis of previous activity
into its analysis of current activity. Both aim to be easy to use, yet be able to use a large number
of signatures to capture a large variety of attacks, and fast enough to analyze traffic at line speed.
10
Conclusion
As increasing numbers of people use the Internet for transactions such as shopping and banking,
more and more opportunities arise for them to make a simple mistake and fall for some scam or give
out personal identification to the wrong people. Safety against malicious activities on the Internet
is an important concern and one which will only continue to grow.
In this dissertation, we proposed a framework for identifying malicious web sites by identifying
infrastructure provisioning practices beneficial to miscreants. Such a framework would be an ideal
complement to existing reactive techniques such as blacklisting. The reactive techniques can ensure
that known attacks get blocked, while our technique will catch a large number of new attacks,
ensuring they do not victimize users before the reactive techniques are adapted to detect them.
10.1 Contributions
We have identified five specific infrastructure provisioning practices, each of which is beneficial to
miscreants and can be used to identify malicious web sites. A few of the practices we identify
have legitimate uses in addition to the malicious ones. This is expected, since the Internet is a
diverse system, and operators of various networks face different constraints. Although this presents
a challenge, we have shown that it can be overcome by identifying additional characteristics that
assist in their distinguishing the good and bad uses. For example, when examining the use of Domain
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Name System (DNS) wildcards, the ratio of Autonomous Systems (ASes) and IP addresses pointed
to by the wildcard records, along with their Time to Live (TTL) can be used for this purpose.
Further, we believe that combining multiple features may also help, since sophisticated miscreants
may use techniques such as fast flux to protect against blacklisting or removal of IP addresses, along
with wildcards to protect against blacklisting of host names. Determining how often such situations
occur, however, is left for future work.
Malicious activities on the Internet are ever-changing. One criticism against our work could
be that malicious activity may evolve, making some of the features we investigated obsolete. For
example, miscreants exploiting fast flux could use fewer hosts at a time or a better host selection
algorithm to complicate its detection, or could abandon the practice altogether in favor of other
strategies. Orphans may be stopped through policy decisions and enforcement by Top Level Domain
(TLD) operators. We have two responses to such criticism. First, if we drive miscreants to abandon
some of these practices, at least we have made their activities more difficult. Second, the actual
features we identified are not as important for themselves as they are as a demonstration that such
features exist. If miscreants move on to different activities, other features could be developed which
identify those. We expect there will always be unique practices miscreants use to gain an advantage,
and have shown that at least in the current Internet, there certainly are. We can take advantage of
these, whatever they may be, to proactively protect users from a large portion of malicious activity.
10.2 Future Work
While we have shown that the framework we describe is promising, there are still several avenues
for future work. We describe a few here.
10.2.1 Combinations of features
While we examined five specific provisioning practices, some of them are in use by good sites as well.
We believe that this issue can be solved through the addition of more features, and an exploration
of which features often occur in combination with each other. If multiple features often occur in
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combination with each other, then these combinations could be used as an even stronger indication
that a web site is malicious. We believe that sophisticated attackers will look for any advantage
they can get to keep their activities alive as long as possible, so we expect that such combinations
could be found.
10.2.2 Identifying hacked sites
The features we propose mostly assume that miscreants have provisioned their own infrastructure,
although possibly on compromised user machines, or bots not actually belonging to them. However,
other methods of setting up malicious web sites are also prevalent. Specifically, miscreants may hack
into legitimate web sites and exploit them in their campaigns. In cases where miscreants provision
their campaigns on the hacked sites, our framework may not be effective, since miscreants may not
have access to the DNS infrastructure of the hacked site. One improvement that can be made based
on this is to identify features of these hacked sites.
10.2.3 Prototype System
Perhaps our most ambitious plan for future work is building a prototype of the proposed framework.
We will begin by training a classifier on known malicious web sites based on the infrastructure
features we investigated, and testing it on other known blacklisted web sites. Assuming success, we
will then move on to investigating other aspects of the proposed system. These include collecting
new Uniform Resource Locators (URLs) quickly enough to mark them as malicious before they can
do significant damage, and examining the overheads introduced to the DNS system by the extra
queries an implementation of our framework would generate.
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